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TYING ARRANGEMENTS AND 
ANTITRUST HARM 
Erik Hovenkamp
*
 & Herbert Hovenkamp
**
 
A tying arrangement is a seller’s requirement that a customer may purchase its 
“tying” product only by taking its “tied” product. In a variable proportion tie the 
purchaser can vary her purchases of the tied product. For example, a customer 
might purchase a single printer, but either a contract or technological design 
requires her to purchase varying numbers of printer cartridges from the same 
manufacturer. Such arrangements are widely considered to be price 
discrimination devices, but their economic effects have been controversial. 
Tying has been attacked on the theory that price discrimination of this sort reduces 
consumer welfare. We show that this argument is based on a misunderstanding of 
the kind of price discrimination that is involved in variable proportion ties. The 
great majority of them almost certainly produce both welfare gains and net 
consumer benefits. 
We also consider and reject the argument that tying produces greater welfare 
losses when viewed from an ex ante rather than an ex post perspective. That 
argument rests on a flawed premise about the sources of the increased returns to 
innovations whose distribution requires tying. Further, it ignores the important 
role of fixed costs in producing innovation incentives. We also show that tying in 
concentrated markets produces significant benefits from the elimination of double 
marginalization. Then we extend our analysis to bundled discounts, focusing on 
the possibility of increased harm that can occur if the monopolist increases the 
standalone price of one good when inaugurating the bundled discount. 
Antitrust’s per se rule is reserved for practices that are so likely to cause antitrust 
harm and have so little to defend them that detailed case-by-case assessment is 
thought to be unnecessary. They can be condemned categorically simply upon a 
showing that a few basic conditions are satisfied and that they belong in a 
particular class of restraints. No kind of unilaterally imposed tying arrangement, 
even by a monopolist, falls into that category. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A tying arrangement is a seller‘s requirement that before a customer may 
purchase the seller‘s ―tying‖ product, she must also take one or more units of the 
seller‘s ―tied‖ product. The tying and tied products are typically complements in 
use, which means that they are consumed together.1 Most ties are contractual in the 
sense that the thing that binds the tying and tied products together is a contract or 
perhaps an intellectual property license. Some ties are ―technological,‖ which 
means that the two products are tied together by virtue of product design. For 
example, the owner of a Kodak Instamatic camera may be able to use only 
Kodak‘s own film cartridges designed to fit that camera,2 or the owner of a 
Lexmark computer printer may be limited by virtue of product design to the use of 
Lexmark ink cartridges.3 Regardless of the type, anticompetitive tying 
arrangements have been illegal under United States antitrust law ever since the 
Motion Picture Patents case in 1917,4 in which the Supreme Court prohibited the 
owner of a patented movie projector from forcing purchasers to agree to use the 
projector only to show the projector seller‘s films. 
This Article examines the presumption that tying arrangements are 
harmful and offers several conclusions about the kind of antitrust analysis that 
should be applied to them. Nearly all the competitive harm that results from tying 
can be divided into two types: (1) foreclosure; and (2) extraction, or ―leverage.‖ 
                                                                                                            
    1. The products can also be complements in production or distribution; that is, 
costs are lower when two products are produced or distributed together. See, e.g., Times-
Picayune Publ‘g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 613 (1953) (refusing to condemn tying 
of advertising in morning and evening newspapers where defendant set type a single time 
for both editions); Brief for 98 Newspaper Publishers as Amicus Curiae, Times-Picayune 
Publ‘g Co. v. United States, 354 U.S. 594 (1953) (Nos. 374–75), 1953 WL 78355, at *13 
(stating that once type is set, cost of printing additional issues is ―hardly any more expense 
than the cost of ink and paper‖). 
    2. See, e.g., Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275 (2d Cir. 
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980) (refusing to condemn technological tie of camera 
and film). 
    3. Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int‘l, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 575, 
588 (E.D. Ky. 2009) (printer manufacturer‘s post-sale tying restriction violated first sale 
doctrine); see also, e.g., Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int‘l, Inc., 2008 WL 
4542735, at *8 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 3, 2008) (declining to reach whether printer–cartridge tie 
constituted patent misuse); Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int‘l, Inc., 487 F. 
Supp. 2d 861, 877–80 (E.D. Ky. 2007) (denying summary judgment on antitrust challenge 
to printer–cartridge tie). On so-called ―technological‖ as opposed to contractual ties, see 10 
PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & EINER ELHAUGE, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1757 (2d 
ed. 2004). 
    4. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516 
(1917) (holding that a projector/film tie violated patent law‘s first sale doctrine, but stating 
that it was ―confirmed‖ in its conclusion by the passage of the Clayton Act); see Christina 
Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1474407. On the scope of the first sale 
doctrine in early twentieth century challenges to patent ties, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-
Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First Sale Doctrine in Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1540527. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1443284
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Foreclosure occurs when a tie ousts or unreasonably limits the opportunities of 
rivals, typically in the tied product market. For example, if a monopoly hospital 
ties anesthesiology services, there may be no market remaining for independent 
anesthesiologists.5 The second type of antitrust harm is extraction, which involves 
overcharges that purchasers of tied packages are forced to pay. This Article is 
concerned almost exclusively with injuries of this latter type, although foreclosure 
concerns occasionally become relevant as well. 
 We do not take a position on the question whether antitrust‘s primary 
concern is with ―total welfare‖ (the sum of producers‘ and consumers‘ surplus) or 
with ―consumer welfare‖ (which considers consumers‘ surplus alone). However, 
we do illustrate the various effects that ties have on welfare as measured by either 
type. We also conclude that a per se rule or ―quasi per se‖ rule has no place in 
tying analysis.
6
 The great majority of ties are beneficial or at least benign, 
measured by either welfare standard, and this is true without even considering 
production efficiencies that many ties produce. 
To demonstrate that tying arrangements should not be presumptively 
illegal under antitrust law, we examine the confusion over the difference between 
second- and third-degree price discrimination, which can lead to the erroneous 
conclusion that ties are harmful because they transfer output from high-value to 
low-value customers.7 We also consider the relationship between the output effects 
of variable proportion ties on consumer welfare, finding that consumers likely 
benefit most of the time.8 For these two queries our focus is mainly on variable 
proportion ties, which are ties in which the usage of the tied product varies from 
one person to another. Next we consider whether the antitrust analysis of tying 
arrangements should differ if one looks at the problem from an ex ante rather than 
an ex post perspective. An ex ante perspective is one that looks over the long run 
at the inducements to engage in product innovation where part of the anticipated 
gains result from tying.9 By contrast, an ex post approach takes established 
products and technologies as given and then compares the economic effects of 
tying as opposed to separate sales. We also analyze the problem of double 
marginalization when two linked markets are both noncompetitive and consider 
how tying benefits consumers by creating a sort of ―reverse leveraging.‖10 Then we 
extend our analysis to bundled discounts, a form of tying in which the customer‘s 
inducement to purchase two goods together is a discount rather than an absolute 
contractual requirement. In particular, we consider the possibility of increased 
harm that can occur if the monopolist increases the standalone price of one good 
                                                                                                            
    5. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 44–45 (1984). 
    6. For a contrary argument, see Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and 
the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 431 & n.89 
(2009). 
    7. See infra text accompanying note 57. 
    8. See infra text accompanying note 90. 
    9. See infra text accompanying notes 92–108. 
    10. See infra text accompanying notes 118–27. 
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when inaugurating the bundled discount.11 Finally, we briefly consider the role of 
efficiencies in justifying ties.12 
At least since the 1950s it has been clear that tying arrangements can be 
used as price-discrimination devices—that is, as devices for obtaining different 
prices or different rates of return from different customers.13 In a variable 
proportion tie, the seller has a monopoly in a tying product, such as a printer, 
which uses some consumable product, such as ink, that consumers purchase as 
they need it. The seller then reduces the price of the tying product, sometimes to 
cost or even to zero,14 but requires purchasers to use its tied product and sells it at a 
premium over the market price. The seller then earns varying amounts of profit 
from different customers, depending on the amount of the tied product that they 
consume. 
The economic effects of price-discrimination ties have provoked 
considerable debate. Specifically, there is confusion about what type of price 
discrimination results from ties. The answer to that question is critical, because 
different types of price discrimination produce very different effects on general or 
consumer welfare. As developed below, the literature on the effects of price 
discrimination strongly distinguishes between second- and third-degree price 
discrimination.15 Third-degree price discrimination that does not increase output 
necessarily decreases welfare.16 This is not true of second-degree price 
discrimination, though, and the economic consensus is that most instances of it are 
probably welfare increasing,17 particularly in the presence of fixed costs.18 As we 
show below, variable proportion ties are a form of second-degree price 
discrimination. Further, they only harm consumer welfare in the most flagrant 
situations, and they often increase welfare even if output falls. Equally important is 
the fact that third-degree price discrimination transfers output from higher-value to 
                                                                                                            
  11. See infra text accompanying notes 133–34. 
  12. See infra text accompanying note 82. 
  13. Ward Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE 
L.J. 19, 21–23 (1957); see also Richard Markovits, Tie-Ins, Reciprocity and the Leverage 
Theory, 76 YALE L.J. 1397 (1967). 
  14. See infra text accompanying notes 74–75. 
  15. See infra text accompanying notes 56–58. 
  16. E.g., Hal R. Varian, Price Discrimination, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 600 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989); Kathleen Carroll 
& Dennis Coates, Teaching Price Discrimination: Some Clarification, 66 S. ECON. J. 466 
(1999); Stephen K. Layson, Third-Degree Price Discrimination with Interdependent 
Demands, 46 J. INDUS. ECON. 511 (1998); Richard Schmalensee, Output and Welfare 
Implications of Monopolistic Third-Degree Price Discrimination, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 242 
(1981). 
  17. See FREDERIC M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE 
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 495 (3d ed. 1990) (―First- or second-degree discrimination 
usually leads to larger output than under simple monopoly, and from there to lower  
dead-weight losses and improved allocative efficiency.‖); see also MASSIMO MOTTA, 
COMPETITION POLICY 494–95 (2004) (second-degree price discrimination tends to improve 
welfare); infra Appendix. 
  18. See infra text accompanying notes 100, 108, 109 (on relevance of fixed 
costs). 
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lower-value customers, thus reducing welfare even if output remains constant. 
Second-degree price discrimination does not have this effect.19 
The term ―welfare‖ has a relatively fixed meaning in economics. It equals 
the sum of consumer and producer surplus, assuming no one else is affected.20 The 
antitrust literature has seen a great deal of debate, however, over whether ―total 
surplus,‖ which is the same thing as the economist‘s ―welfare,‖ should govern 
antitrust policy, or whether antitrust should limit its concern to ―consumer 
welfare.‖21 A consumer welfare standard seeks to maximize consumer surplus 
without regard to effects on producer surplus. For example, under the consumer 
welfare standard a merger that simultaneously increases productive efficiency and 
raises price would be unlawful, even if the profit gains to the merging firms were 
greater than the higher prices to consumers.22 This is because the merger increases 
total welfare but reduces consumer welfare. We do not express any opinion on this 
issue, but throughout this Article we make several observations about both the 
general welfare effects and the consumer welfare effects of ties. Clearly, however, 
a practice that increases both total welfare and consumer welfare should not be 
condemned under either of these tests, while a practice that reduces both might be. 
Importantly, a firm imposes tying only if it is profitable to do so. As a result, a tie 
that increases consumer welfare necessarily increases general economic welfare as 
well, assuming the welfare of third parties is not negatively affected. 
The antitrust laws do not speak of either measure of welfare and, indeed, 
never use the term ―welfare‖ at all. The provisions that are most relevant to tying 
are section 1 of the Sherman Act23 and section 3 of the Clayton Act.24 The 
                                                                                                            
  19. See infra text accompanying notes 55–58. 
  20. A ―surplus‖ is the difference between the amount someone is willing to 
accept or pay for something and the amount he or she must actually accept or pay. For 
example, if a consumer is willing to pay $3 for a loaf of bread but the grocery store price is 
$2, the consumer receives a surplus of $1. 
  21. See, e.g., Albert A. Foer, The Goals of Antitrust: Thoughts on Consumer 
Welfare in the US, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH IN TRANS-ATLANTIC ANTITRUST (PHILIP 
MARSDEN ed., 2006) (arguing for consumer welfare standard); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 3.1 (3d ed. 
2005) (summarizing the debate); John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Chicago 
School’s Foundation is Flawed: Antitrust Protects Consumers, not Efficiency, in HOW THE 
CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 89 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008); Dennis W. Carlton, Does 
Antitrust Need to be Modernized?, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 155 (2007) (arguing for total 
welfare); Alan J. Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us a Total Welfare Standard and Why We Should 
Keep It, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 659 (2010); see also Joseph Farrell & Michael L. Katz, The 
Economics of Welfare Standards in Antitrust, 2 COMPETITION POL‘Y INT‘L 3 (2006) 
(presenting a balanced discussion evaluating both standards). 
  22. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare 
Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968). 
  23. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
  24. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2006). The case of a monopolist under section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006), could also be relevant. However, section 2‘s 
requirement of ―monopolizing‖ conduct presumably refers only to ―foreclosing‖ ties, or ties 
that cause harm by excluding rivals. These are not the subject of this Article. 
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Sherman Act provision extends to conduct ―in restraint of trade,‖ and the Clayton 
Act provision reaches conduct where ―the effect . . . may be substantially to lessen 
competition.‖25 A natural meaning of conduct that ―restrains trade‖ is conduct that 
reduces market output below the level it would otherwise be. In the case of 
variable proportion ties, however, we show that output effects are not the same as 
either general-welfare or consumer-welfare effects. A tie that reduces output might 
increase both general welfare and consumer welfare, while a tie that increases 
output might conceivably harm both, although this is less likely.26 Further, the 
term ―output‖ itself requires further clarification because a variable proportion tie 
typically affects two different outputs: that of the tying product and that of the tied 
product. It typically increases the output of the tying product, such as a printer. In 
some cases it decreases the volume of the tied product, such as ink cartridges, 
although in other cases it increases tied product volume as well. 
Nonforeclosing ties, or those that do not cause competitive harm by 
excluding rivals,27 may extract higher prices from some customers, but they also 
charge lower prices to others and typically bring new customers into the market. 
As a result, the case for condemning them is very weak. The principal means of 
extraction is price discrimination.28 While the economic literature on price 
discrimination and tying focuses on monopolists, most challenged ties occur in 
oligopoly markets where the defendant typically has no more market power than 
results from product differentiation.29 Indeed, many franchise ties, which are of 
variable proportions, occur in competitive or even highly competitive 
product-differentiated markets and involve nondominant firms.30 In those cases a 
tie that includes a substantial price reduction in the tying product can increase the 
number of sales significantly. The true monopoly case is the rare, but hardly 
unheard of, worst case scenario. However, even if output of the tied product falls 
                                                                                                            
  25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 14. 
  26. See infra Appendix. 
  27. The foreclosure rationale for condemning ties is that they exclude, or 
foreclose, rivals in the tied product market. For example, by requiring all those who use its 
surgical facilities to purchase its anesthesiologist services, a hospital might be able to 
exclude rival anesthesiologists from the market. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 
466 U.S. 2 (1984) (refusing to condemn a hospital‘s surgical facility/anesthesiologist tie 
where hospital did not have dominant market share for surgical admissions; plaintiff was 
excluded rival anesthesiologist). By contrast, when a maker of salt-injection machines 
requires users to purchase its salt, foreclosure cannot be a threat, since such machines 
process only a miniscule percentage of the salt market. See Int‘l Salt Co. v. United States, 
332 U.S. 392 (1947) (condemning such a tie); see also 9 AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & ELHAUGE, 
supra note 3, ¶¶ 1704–1709 (foreclosure and its assessment); id. ¶¶ 1722–1726 
(nonforeclosing ties). 
  28. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, § 10.6e (discussing the basic economics of 
price discrimination ties); SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 17, § 13. 
  29. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 367–74 (1988) 
(noting that most variable proportion ties occur in oligopoly markets). 
  30. See, e.g., Kypta v. McDonald‘s Corp., 671 F.2d 1282 (11th Cir. 1982) (fast 
food; hamburgers and related products; tying of lease of location); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, 
Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971) (minor fast food fried chicken franchisor; condemning tying of 
spices and supplies); Little Caesar Enters., Inc. v. Smith, 34 F. Supp. 2d 459 (E.D. Mich. 1998) 
(pizza; tying of paper plates and other products bearing franchisor‘s logo). 
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under variable proportion tying, it is generally impossible to demonstrate that the 
tie harms welfare because many of the consumers who buy fewer units under tying 
are nevertheless better off as a result of the tie. For these consumers, the price cut 
applied to the tying product contributes more to consumer surplus than is extracted 
by the increase in the tied product‘s price. If the market includes a relatively high 
number of these customers, it is possible that output of the tied product falls while 
consumer welfare increases.31 
The traditional concern of tying arrangements was ―leverage.‖ Leverage 
is the fear that a firm with a monopoly in one product could create a second 
monopoly by requiring purchasers or lessees of the first product to purchase a 
second product from that firm as well. The concern over leverage first emerged in 
patent law.32 For example, in the Carbice decision the Supreme Court condemned 
an arrangement under which the seller of a patented ice box required those who 
used it to purchase its dry ice as well.33 The tie was nonforeclosing, since dry ice, 
which occurred naturally and was readily manufactured, was not patentable.34 
Nevertheless, Justice Brandeis wrote, the requirement was an unlawful leveraging 
of the ice box patent because it enabled the patentee to ―derive its profit not from 
the invention on which the law gives it a monopoly, but from the unpatented supplies 
with which it is used.‖35 If a monopoly could be contractually expanded in this way, a 
patentee ―might conceivably monopolize the commerce in a large part of unpatented 
materials used in its manufacture. The owner of a patent for a machine might thereby 
secure a partial monopoly on the unpatented supplies consumed in its operation.‖36 
Many antitrust theories prior to the 1980s were based on exaggerated views 
of the anticompetitive possibilities of leverage. In general, however, leverage was 
never a significant component in Harvard School antitrust analysis,37 and it was 
enthusiastically rejected by the Chicago School of Antitrust,38 particularly after Ward 
Bowman‘s article came out in 1957.39 While no one disputes that a monopolist can 
design contractual mechanisms that exploit its monopoly position by price 
discrimination, attaching strong implications to this for competition policy has proven 
to be all but impossible.40 
                                                                                                            
  31. See infra text accompanying notes 88–89. 
  32. See Bohannan, supra note 4, at 15. 
  33. Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 31–32 (1931). 
  34. Dry ice had been discovered in the 1830s by Charles Thilorier, a French 
chemist, as the residue from rapid evaporation of liquid carbon dioxide. See Duane H.D. 
Roller, Thilorier and the First Solidification of a “Permanent” Gas (1835), 43 ISIS 109 
(1952). 
  35. Carbice, 283 U.S. at 31–32. 
  36. Id. at 32. 
  37. See Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis: 1890–
1955, 94 MINN. L. REV. 311 (2009). 
  38. See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. 
L. REV. 925, 933–35 (1979). 
  39. See Bowman, supra note 13. 
  40. See, e.g., 3B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 
¶ 781 (3d ed. 2008) (product innovation as antitrust violation). 
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In Bowman‘s price discrimination model the tying arrangement served as 
an alternative to selling the machine itself at different prices to different 
customers. As Bowman observed, such an attempt would encounter two different 
problems. First, the seller would have a difficult time identifying the users who 
valued the product more. Second, those who paid a lower price would arbitrage the 
machine to higher-value users,41 thus defeating the scheme.42 In fact, the two 
strategies are often used simultaneously. For example, a printer manufacturer 
might engage in cartridge tying while also offering different packages to 
commercial and residential users, or discounts to educational institutions. This 
would be a combination of second- and third-degree price discrimination.43 
One problem with the leverage argument is its ambiguity. A tie cannot 
create a second ―monopoly‖ in the tied product unless the latter has no untied uses. 
For example, even if Justice Brandeis‘s ice box manufacturer
44
 had an ice box 
monopoly, tying ice would not create a second monopoly as long as there were 
numerous uses of dry ice that did not involve the monopolist‘s ice box. 
Fundamentally, the leverage theory concerns ―extraction,‖ not monopoly. The 
monopolist is obtaining a higher price for the dry ice it sells, but the rest of the dry 
ice market remains unaffected, assuming it is competitive. 
I. NONFORECLOSING TIES 
AND SECOND-DEGREE PRICE DISCRIMINATION 
Ever since the time of Cambridge economist Arthur Cecil Pigou, price 
discrimination has been divided into three classes, or ―degrees.‖45 First-degree, or 
―perfect,‖ price discrimination involves selling each unit of a good at the highest 
price any consumer is willing to pay for that unit. Output in that case rises to the 
competitive level because every sale is made right down to marginal cost. 
However, the entire surplus goes to the seller rather than to the customers.46 
Strictly speaking, neither variable proportion tying nor any other real world 
practice constitutes first-degree price discrimination because sellers cannot 
                                                                                                            
  41. ―Arbitrage‖ in this context refers to the practice by which those who pay a 
lower price for a good resell it to others who are otherwise required to pay a higher price. 
The arbitrage price will lie between the two prices given by the monopolist. 
  42. Bowman, supra note 13, at 23 (using as an example Heaton-Peninsular 
Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 65 F. 619 (C.C.W.D. Mich. 1895), in which 
the defendant required users of each button fastening machine to purchase its buttons). 
  43. See Allan C. Deserpa, A Note on Second Degree Price Discrimination and 
Its Implications, 2 REV. INDUS. ORG. 368 (1985) (real world practices often involve a 
combination of second- and third-degree discrimination). 
  44. Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 31–32 (1931); 
see supra text accompanying notes 33–36. 
  45. See ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE § II.17.5 (4th ed. 
1932). 
  46. See Michael Spence, Product Selection, Fixed Costs and Monopolistic 
Competition, 43 REV. ECON. STUD. 217, 219 (1976). 
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practically extract the highest price that the consumer is willing to pay on each 
sale.47 
Even an exceptionally-finely-tuned variable proportion tie will not come 
very close to first-degree price discrimination. While a well executed printer–ink 
tie could accurately make prices proportional to the number of copies a person 
prints, it could not control for the fact that different purchasers place different 
values on each copy. For example, both a law firm drafting legal opinions on 
securities offerings and a printer of handbills about garage sales might print 1000 
pages weekly. As a result, if they purchased identical printers under the same tying 
arrangement, they would pay the same amount per print. But given what is at 
stake, the law firm might value printing at many dollars per page, while the 
handbill printer values printed pages at only a few cents. The variable proportion 
tie will not capture these differences in valuation and will thus permit at least some 
consumers to retain surpluses. 
By contrast to first-degree discrimination, second- and third-degree price 
discrimination are quite common. Although they are very different practices, some 
complex schemes may contain attributes of both.48 In third-degree price 
discrimination the seller divides customers into discrete groups based on 
observations about their willingness to pay, and each group is charged a unique 
price. Prices offered to one group are not made available to the other group.49 For 
example, the manufacturer of computer software might license it to commercial 
users at a higher rate, and to home users at a lower rate.50 This sort of 
discrimination is profitable only when consumer valuations are concentrated into 
two or more distinct price intervals. If the monopolist were to charge a single 
monopoly price, it would very likely set it somewhere between the high and low 
                                                                                                            
  47. The closest situation would be an auction in which each unit available in the 
entire market is sold to the highest bidder until every unit is sold. Even here, however, the 
winning bid does not represent the winner‘s willingness to pay, but only the fact that no 
other bidder was willing to pay more. For example, if bidders bid against each other until 
one bidder wins at a price of $50, we know that no other bidder was willing to pay more 
than $50, but the winning bidder may have been willing to pay $51 or more. The so-called 
―Dutch‖ auction, in which the auctioneer starts with a high price and then comes down until 
a bidder accepts it comes about as close as any real world situation to first-degree price 
discrimination. See Johannes Horner & Larry Samuelson, Managing Strategic Buyers 
(Cowles Found., Working Paper No. 1684R, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1673898. 
  48. See Deserpa, supra note 43. 
  49. In the words of Arthur Cecil Pigou: 
This degree, it will be noticed, differs fundamentally from either of the 
preceding degrees, in that it may involve the refusal to satisfy, in one 
market, demands represented by demand prices in excess of some of 
those which, in another market, are satisfied. 
PIGOU, supra note 45, § II.17.5. 
  50. See, e.g., Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124 (1938) 
(licensing of technology to produce sound amplifiers at different rates to producers for 
commercial use and for home use); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(licensing of database to commercial and residential users at different rates); see also 
Christina Bohannan, Copyright Preemption of Contracts, 67 MD. L. REV. 616, 632 (2008). 
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prices used to discriminate between groups.51 The discrimination scheme excludes 
consumers whose valuations lie below the price they have been offered even if that 
price is higher than the nondiscriminatory monopoly price. On the other hand, the 
scheme ordinarily draws in some consumers who would have been unwilling to 
pay the monopoly price. As a result, third-degree price discrimination has the very 
important effect of redirecting output from consumers with relatively high 
valuations to those with relatively low ones. Hence, consumer welfare will be 
harmed even if output levels are maintained but do not increase.  
To take a simple example, suppose a monopolist identifies and segregates 
two groups of customers, offering the first group a price of $8 and the second a 
price of $5. Buyers in the high price group will purchase until their marginal 
valuations of the good fall to $8 and then stop, because they cannot purchase at a 
price of, say, $7.90, even if they wish to. The $7.90 price is profitable to the seller, 
and the seller is actually selling to others at a profitable price of $5. As a result, the 
discrimination scheme takes a sale away from a high-valuation customer, willing 
to pay $7.90, and shifts it to a low-valuation customer. This has led economists 
since the time of Pigou52 and Joan Robinson53 to infer that third-degree price 
discrimination reduces welfare whenever it fails to generate more output than 
simple monopoly pricing.54 
By contrast, in second-degree price discrimination everyone is offered the 
same price schedule, with different unit prices corresponding to different quantities 
or product varieties.55 A quantity-discount scheme is one example. Another is 
division of transportation tickets by classes. For example, airlines might offer 
first-class and coach tickets, or advance-purchase and immediate-purchase fares. 
The same fare structure is available to everyone, but different customers make 
different choices based on willingness to pay, and profitability is higher for some 
classifications than for others. For example, the lawyer accustomed to flying first 
class, but facing an economic recession, might choose to shift all or part of her air 
travel to coach. When conditions improve she may switch back. 
To be sure, second-degree price discrimination produces distortions from 
perfect competition, but they are much different distortions than third-degree price 
discrimination encounters. The one problem second-degree price discrimination 
                                                                                                            
  51. In some instances the monopolist might discriminate only between customers 
willing to pay the monopoly price and some group of high-value customers willing to pay 
more. 
  52. In Pigou‘s words: ―This degree [third], it will be noticed, differs 
fundamentally from either of the preceding degrees, in that it may involve the refusal to 
satisfy, in one market, demands represented by demand prices in excess of some of those 
which, in another market, are satisfied.‖ PIGOU, supra note 45, § II.17.5. 
  53. See JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 205–06 
(1933). 
  54. See Marius Schwartz, Third-Degree Price Discrimination and Output: 
Generalizing a Welfare Result, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 1259 (1990); see also Schmalensee, 
supra note 16; Hal R. Varian, Price Discrimination and Social Welfare, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 
870 (1985).  
  55. GORDON MILLS, RETAIL PRICING STRATEGIES AND MARKET POWER 25–26 
(2002). 
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does not typically encounter is the discontinuities in marginal substitution that are 
characteristic of third-degree discrimination. For example, if flying first class is 
too straining on a person‘s budget as she does more of it, she is always free to shift 
part or all of her purchases to coach. As the number of classifications in a second-
degree price discrimination scheme increases, the scheme comes closer to 
approximating first-degree (or ―perfect‖) price discrimination,56 under which each 
individual customer pays his or her reservation price, and output increases toward 
the competitive level.57 In practice, few second-degree schemes reach anything 
close to that level of classification. However, variable proportion ties theoretically 
permit an infinite number of degrees depending on the number of tied units a 
consumer buys. 
Variable proportion ties have been attacked on the premise that they 
―reallocat[e] output from high-value buyers to low-value buyers.‖
58
 That argument 
is based on the faulty premise, however, that they are a form of third-degree price 
discrimination or that there is no real difference between second- and third-degree 
price discrimination. That premise can then lead to the conclusion that variable 
proportion ties reduce consumer welfare even if they increase output, because the 
increased output accrues to consumers who place a lower value on the tied product 
(or the tying-tied combination), while higher prices and possible reduced output 
accrues to other higher-value consumers. 
But the argument has no application to second-degree price 
discrimination, which covers all ties in which the tying and tied products are 
offered at the same nominal price to all customers. Some ties may also contain 
attributes of third-degree price discrimination, but they would have to be more 
complex than the ordinary tie. For example, a manufacturer of printers and ink 
might tie printers and ink but also charge a higher price for either or both products 
to commercial users than to home users. In that case the printer–ink tie would be 
an instance of second-degree price discrimination while the differential price to 
commercial and home users would be an instance of third-degree price 
discrimination. 
So what type of price discrimination are variable proportion ties? Clearly, 
as noted above, they are not first-degree price discrimination.59 The economic 
literature generally deals with variable proportion ties as second-degree price 
                                                                                                            
  56. In perfect price discrimination every individual buyer is charged his 
reservation price and output is restored to the competitive level. Welfare is higher than 
under monopoly pricing, although consumers‘ surplus is lower. 
  57. PIGOU, supra note 45, § II.17.11: 
It is readily seen that the effects of monopoly plus discrimination of the 
second degree approximate towards those of monopoly plus 
discrimination of the first degree, as the number of different prices, 
which it is possible for the monopolist to charge, increases; just as the 
area of a polygon inscribed in a circle approximates to the area of the 
circle as the number of its sides increases . . . . 
  58. Elhauge, supra note 6, at 431 & n.89. 
  59. See supra text accompanying note 47. 
936 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 52:925 
discrimination.60 This is because, first, as noted above, third-degree price 
discrimination involves a seller‘s segregation of groups of customers based on 
willingness to pay prior to the sale.61 Tying does not; rather, the tying firm selects 
the products and places them on the market, with the same price schedule to all. 
Customers identify themselves by selecting the portion of the schedule that they 
want.62 Moreover, the profitability of a tying strategy is not affected by its ability 
to distinguish between consumers with different valuations. Tying can be a viable 
strategy even when consumers‘ preferences are too idiosyncratic to be discerned 
with any information available ex ante.  
Printers and ink cartridges are near-perfect complements. Two goods are 
complements if the value of the pair exceeds the sum of the values the goods retain 
in the other‘s absence. Perfect complements exist where each good has no value 
unless used with the other. For the most part, consumers use printers and ink 
cartridges together.63 Customers may all purchase a single printer but use it by 
differing amounts, in which case the customer‘s average cost of using the printer 
(i.e., the per-print price) decreases as the total amount of use increases.64 No two 
consumers who do the same amount of printing will be required to pay different 
per-print prices, even if one consumer derives more total value from her prints. 
Thus, the tie operates as a quantity discount: the more you print, the less you pay 
per page. This is exactly the sort of situation that occurs under second-degree price 
discrimination.  
Pigou‘s point in distinguishing between second- and third-degree price 
discrimination was to differentiate situations where customers‘ valuations could be 
identified ex ante and offers made to them separately (third degree), from 
situations where the seller knew something about demand generally but could not 
identify the specific buyers at the time of the sale.65 As a result, the seller used the 
price schedule to enable buyers to self select. For these reasons the economics 
literature identifies two-part tariffs, which strongly resemble variable proportion 
ties, as forms of second-degree price discrimination.66 In a two-part tariff a seller 
requires consumers to pay a ―fixed‖ fee before they can begin purchasing 
                                                                                                            
  60. See, e.g., TIROLE, supra note 29, at 147 (ties a form of second-degree price 
discrimination); see also Richard A. Posner, Vertical Restraints and Antitrust Policy, 72 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 229, 236 (2005) (same). 
  61. See MILLS, supra note 55, at 26 (2002) (difference between second- and 
third-degree price discrimination is that in second-degree discrimination seller cannot 
distinguish customers into diverse groups, but rather they self-select according to a uniform 
pricing schedule). 
  62. See id. 
  63. The value of a printer without a cartridge might be a little greater than zero. 
For example, a printer without an ink cartridge might be used as a doorstop, or perhaps on 
the set of a television show like The Office. 
  64. See infra Table 1. 
  65. See PIGOU, supra note 45, § II.17. 
  66. See, e.g., SATYA R. CHAKRAVARTY, MICROECONOMICS 355 (2002); JEAN-
JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN PROCUREMENT AND 
REGULATION 175–78 (1993); TIROLE, supra note 29, § 3.3.1; see also TIMOTHY C.G. FISHER 
& ROBERT G. WASCHIK, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS: A GAME THEORETIC APPROACH 45 
(2002). 
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individual units of the good at a constant ―marginal‖ price. Neither the fixed fee 
nor the marginal price differs among consumers, regardless of how many units 
they buy or what valuations they maintain. However, when the one time fee is 
factored into the total price, the average price of each unit falls as more units are 
purchased. This causes two-part tariffs to resemble quantity discounting, which 
explains why they too are classified as second-degree price discrimination 
mechanisms. For example, a water company might charge home users a rate of ten 
dollars per month plus one dollar per hundred gallons of water consumed. Such 
tariffs are typically used in situations where fixed costs are too high to be covered 
under marginal-cost pricing. Further, building a fixed-cost component into the 
usage charge would result in higher-volume users paying much more. So the tariff 
effectively segregates the fixed-cost component by means of the fixed fee, while 
the variable costs are billed on the basis of usage.67 
Professor Elhauge has argued that even if a price-discrimination tie 
should increase output, welfare consequences are negative because imperfect 
discrimination schemes switch output from high-value to low-value purchasers.68 
This is clearly true of third-degree price discrimination, and a principal reason for 
its inefficiencies. To return to the previous example, suppose a discrimination 
scheme divides customers into two discrete classes where arbitrage is impossible, 
and charges prices to the two classes of $8 and $5, respectively. Buyers in the first 
group will purchase down to the point that the marginal value they place on the 
incremental purchase (i.e., their marginal rate of substitution) is $8, but they will 
not purchase more. As a result, a sale to someone in this group at a price of $7.90 
is left unmade, even as sales are being made to the lower-price group at a price of 
$5. So to the extent that third-degree price discrimination shifts output away from 
the higher-value group and toward the lower-value group, the discontinuity 
guarantees that the value of the marginal sale lost to the higher-priced group is 
greater than the value of the marginal sale made to the lower-priced group.69 
However, this is not the case with the variable proportion tie. To be sure, 
the tie reduces fixed costs to the buyer (e.g., the printer) and increases marginal 
                                                                                                            
  67. See Mark Armstrong & David E.M. Sappington, Recent Developments in the 
Theory of Regulation, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1557, 1683 (Mark 
Armstrong & Robert H. Porter eds., 2007); W. KIP VISCUSI, JOHN M. VERNON & JOSEPH E. 
HARRINGTON, JR., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 348–50 (4th ed. 2005). 
  68. Elhauge, supra note 6, at 405 (―[I]mperfect price discrimination . . . 
reallocates some output to buyers who put less value on it.‖); see also id. at 431 (arguing 
that tying that achieves intraproduct price discrimination, the common result of variable 
proportion ties, ―does not alter the profit-maximizing output, but reallocates some output 
from high-value buyers to low-value buyers‖). 
  69. See Schmalensee, supra note 16, at 242–43: 
For any fixed total output of the monopolized product, efficiency 
requires that all buyers have the same marginal valuation of additional 
units. (If all buyers are households, they must have the same marginal 
rate of substitution between the good involved and any numeraire good.) 
Selling the same product at different prices to different buyers induces 
different marginal valuations and produces what Robinson terms ―a 
maldistribution of resources as between different uses.‖ 
(quoting ROBINSON, supra note 53, at 206). 
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costs (e.g., the ink cartridge), and any marginal-cost increase is a distortion. But 
under the variable proportion tie, the distortion is continuous across the demand 
curve and is the same for everyone. For example, suppose that the monopoly price 
for the printer is $400 and the competitive ink price is 2¢ per printed page. The 
dominant firm uses a variable proportion tie, cutting the printer price to $200 but 
tying ink and charging 4¢ per printed page for the ink. To the customer the printer 
is a fixed cost and the ink is variable, so the tie has the effect of reducing fixed 
costs but increasing variable costs.70 The marginal cost of 4¢ per copy is the same 
for all buyers at all places on the demand curve, from those that print the most to 
those that print the least. Each buyer will print copies up to the point that marginal 
value for that buyer drops to 4¢ per print. As a result, in equilibrium, the less 
intensive user and the more intensive user both value the marginal print at 4¢ and 
there is no transfer at the margin from higher to lower value. On a per-page basis, 
the value of sales lost in the upper region of the demand curve is precisely equal to 
the value of sales lost in the lower region. If such a tie increases output (measured 
by printed pages), it very likely also increases welfare. This lack of discontinuity 
in marginal valuation is also why it seems appropriate to characterize variable 
proportion ties as instances of second-degree price discrimination. 
The fact that purchases are reallocated under tying does not prima facie 
imply that consumer welfare is harmed. In fact, because the price cut applied to the 
tying product is more significant to lower-use customers, they often benefit from 
tying even if they purchase fewer units of the tied product.71 As a result, even 
when a tie reduces output of the tied product, it may increase consumer welfare. 
II. A CLOSER LOOK AT PRICE DISCRIMINATION TIES 
Both economists and others often use the term ―price discrimination‖ to 
mean charging different prices to two different groups, or for two different classes 
of sales. More technically, it is commonly defined as sales at differing ratios of 
price to marginal cost, or as prices that have different percentage markups in 
relation to cost.72 While economists seem to prefer the latter definitions as a 
technical matter, the models generally define third-degree price discrimination as 
the charging of different prices to different classes of consumers. In many of the 
models marginal cost is simply assumed to be zero.
73
 All of this is complicated by 
                                                                                                            
  70. As a result of these lowered fixed costs, some purchasers who bought prior 
to the tie are benefitted from the arrangement; all new purchasers brought in by the tie are 
benefitted. See infra text accompanying note 86. 
  71. See infra text accompanying notes 78–79. 
  72. See GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 210 (3d ed. 1966); Varian, 
supra note 16, at 597–98; S.J. Liebowitz, Price Differentials and Price Discrimination: 
Reply and Extensions, 26 ECON. INQUIRY 779 (1988). 
  73. E.g., Mark Armstrong, Recent Developments in the Economics of Price 
Discrimination, in 2 ADVANCES IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS: THEORY AND 
APPLICATIONS, NINTH WORLD CONGRESS 97 (Richard Blundell, Whitney K. Newey & 
Torsten Persson eds., 2006), available at http://www.econ.ucl.ac.uk/downloads/ 
armstrong/pd.pdf (―[P]rice discrimination exists when two ‗similar‘ products with the same 
marginal cost are sold by a firm at different prices.‖); David A. Malueg, Bounding the 
Welfare Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1011, 1011 
(1993) (charging ―different groups of customers different prices‖); Schmalensee, supra note 
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the fact that real-world practices contain attributes of both definitions, often within 
the same scheme. For example, consider the airline that practices second-degree 
price discrimination by selling first-class and coach seats at different prices. At 
least part of the differential may be explained by differences in costs: first-class 
passengers receive more costly treatment. But to the extent that the airline earns 
more on first-class passengers notwithstanding these extra costs, differential 
returns are present as well. The same thing can be true of third-degree price 
discrimination. For example, the seller who provides software to commercial and 
residential customers at different prices might be earning different returns, but it 
might also be supplying some services to the higher-price commercial customers 
that the lower-price residential customers do not receive. In sum, price 
discrimination in practice is a more complex phenomenon than Pigou‘s original 
formulation indicated. 
Variable proportion ties are also complex price discrimination 
arrangements. First, the components of a variable proportion tie involve price 
discrimination only when they are considered together. When the goods are 
viewed separately, the ratio of price to marginal cost is the same for all customers. 
For example, everyone pays the same price for the printer, and the same price for 
each individual ink cartridge. However, because the components of a variable 
proportion tie are used together, and often have little value when they are 
separated, it is much more helpful to consider the prices paid for the entire tie. This 
allows for comparison of the different amounts consumers pay for each unit of the 
tying product‘s use, which can be measured in units of the tied good. If the tie 
consists of a printer and ink cartridges, we should consider the different amounts 
consumers pay per print, which will vary depending on the total amount of 
printing a consumer does. Table 1 on the following page illustrates three different 
pricing scenarios for a monopoly seller of digital photograph printers and their 
cartridges. Because customers place little or no value on printers or cartridges 
separately, the relevant price is the one that they pay for a photo, which is the thing 
they value. 
Whenever the tying product‘s price is above zero, the average cost of 
using that good falls as the total amount of use increases. Specifically, the average 
cost of using the tying product converges on the price of the tied product. Holding 
the price of the tied product constant, the variation in average cost of using the 
combination is smaller as the price of the tying product decreases. One can view 
the difference between the highest and lowest average costs within this range as a 
measure of how extensively a tie discriminates.  
In Scenario A in Table 1, which is non-tying, the monopolist charges all 
purchasers its standalone profit-maximizing price for the photo printer, which is 
$400. Cartridges are sold under competition at a marginal-cost price that comes 
out to 2¢ per photo. All buyers pay the same amount for the printer and the same 
amount for each cartridge. In Scenario B, the monopolist drops the price of the 
printer to $300 but ties cartridges at a price of 4¢ per photo. Once again, everyone 
pays the same price for printers and for ink. Under the third scenario the 
                                                                                                            
16, at 242 (―A monopolist maximizes profit by charging different prices to different markets 
or classes of customers.‖); see also ROBINSON, supra note 53, at 192–95. 
940 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 52:925 
monopolist charges a price of zero for the printer but ties cartridges at a constant 
price of 8¢ per photo. Alternatively, it could keep the printers and simply print the 
photos itself from customers‘ emailed files, at a price of 8¢ per photo. Mail order 
sites such as Snapfish.com or Shutterfly.com offer such services.74 Price–marginal 
cost ratios are the same for all these scenarios. 
Table 1: 
Total Cost Per Print at Different Consumption Levels 
Total 
Photo 
Quantity 
1K 2K 3K 4K 5K 6K 7K 8K 9K 
10
K 
A* 42¢ 22¢ 15.3¢ 12¢ 10¢ 8.7¢ 7.7¢ 7¢ 6.4¢ 6¢ 
B* 34¢ 19¢ 14¢ 11.5¢ 10¢ 9¢ 8.3¢ 7.7¢ 7.3¢ 7¢ 
C 8¢ 8¢ 8¢ 8¢ 8¢ 8¢ 8¢ 8¢ 8¢ 8¢ 
 
Scenario A: $400 for the printer, which is its standalone profit-
maximizing price; cartridges not tied and are sold at a competitive 
price of 2¢ per photo. 
Scenario B: $300 for the printer, which is marginal cost; cartridges are 
tied and sold for 4¢ per photo. 
Scenario C: $0 for the printer; cartridges are tied and sold for 8¢ per 
photo.75 
*Costs per print are calculated by taking the price of the printer and 
dividing it by the output, and then adding the cartridge costs per photo. 
 
For each scenario, the table shows the different prices per printed photo 
that consumers pay at different quantities of photos, which range from 1000 to 
10,000 photos. We assume that the printer is an upfront cost, needs no 
maintenance, and is worn out and must be discarded after it prints 10,000 photos or 
within a finite time period such as three years.76 In Scenario A the customer who 
makes 1000 photos ends up paying 2¢ in variable costs per photo, plus 400/1000, 
or 40¢ for the amortized costs of using the printer. If that customer increases its 
usage to 5000 prints, then variable costs are still 2¢ but now the amortized printer 
costs are 400/5000, or 8¢. 
                                                                                                            
  74. See SNAPFISH, http://www.snapfish.com (last visited Oct. 9, 2010) (offering 
prints as low as 9¢); SHUTTERFLY, http://www.shutterfly.com (last visited Oct. 9, 2010) 
(offering prints as low as 9¢). 
  75. Cf. Xerox Corp. v. Media Scis., Inc., 660 F. Supp. 2d 535, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (observing, in a printer–ink tie situation, that Xerox and other major manufacturers 
offer their printers on a ―cost per page‖ basis as an alternative to sales). 
  76. Id. at 541, 548 (observing, in a printer–ink tie situation, that the average life 
of a printer is three years). 
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The principal effect of tying in the printer–cartridge story (or numerous 
similar stories in the litigated cases) is that consumers’ cost structure changes by 
making a larger portion of their costs variable rather than fixed. Charging the 
standalone monopoly price for the printer plus the competitive price for ink causes 
fixed costs to play a larger role in a consumer‘s cost structure, because printer 
costs do not vary with use. At the other extreme, charging zero for the printer and a 
high price for the cartridges makes all consumer costs variable. 
The result is that, from the consumer‘s viewpoint, the range of 
discriminatory prices becomes smaller as the price cut in the tying product 
increases. Tying reduces rather than increases the disparity in what consumers pay 
to use the tying product. The non-tying case (Scenario A) produces printing costs 
that range from a high of 42¢ per photo to a low of 6¢ per photo over the output 
ranges in question. Scenario B, the ―moderate‖ tying case, which entails a 
marginal-cost price for the printer plus 4¢ per photo for the cartridge, yields a 
range of 34¢ down to 7¢ per photo. And the ―aggressive‖ tying case, which 
involves a price of zero for the printer and 8¢ per photo for the cartridges, 
produces constant costs of 8¢ per photo at all output levels. This makes it cheaper 
for low intensity consumers to use the tying product, because total costs are lower 
at low quantities of total use. To generalize, the more of the price that the 
monopolist transfers from the tying product (printer) to the tied product (photos), 
the less discrimination will result in the price of the tied product to the 
monopolist‘s customers. The limiting case occurs when the tying product price is 
reduced to zero. In that case, the price of a photo is the same at all output levels. 
Note also that in our scenario the per page gains from consumers whose 
purchases are at the lower end of the scale gain far more than the purchasers at the 
high end lose. The most extreme tie is worth 34¢ per page to the lowest-intensity 
customer, while it costs the highest-intensity customer 2¢ per page. Of course, the 
highest-intensity customer is making ten times as many pages. Intellectual 
property licenses and franchise ties tend to have these characteristics. For example, 
a patentee might license a patent at a fixed rate of, say, $1000 per year and the 
licensee could produce as little or as much as it pleased during that time period. Or 
it could engage in two-part pricing—say, $500 upfront plus a 2% royalty on sales 
(similar to ―moderate‖ tying in the above illustration). Or, as is most typical, it 
could charge zero upfront but a higher royalty on sales (similar to Scenario C in 
Table 1). The straight royalty increases the patentee‘s revenue from high-volume 
users, but it also serves to bring into the market low-volume users who are unable 
to pay a high fixed price up front. If the licensor‘s marginal costs are zero, even a 
licensee who produces one unit is profitable to the licensor. 
If the monopolist simply printed the photos itself and mailed them to 
customers, then the cost structures faced by consumers become nondiscriminatory 
for the same reason that they are nondiscriminatory under tying when the price of 
the tying product is zero. In this case, the per-print price paid by consumers is the 
same regardless of how many prints they buy. In both Scenarios A and B in Table 
1, welfare could theoretically be improved by a form of arbitrage. Low-volume 
purchasers could ask higher-volume purchasers to print for them. As more printing 
was aggregated on fewer printers, per-unit costs would decline, perhaps until every 
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printer was fully utilized at a price of 6¢ per photo in Scenario A. Of course, 
transaction costs might defeat such a scheme. 
III. ASSESSING OUTPUT IN LITIGATED TYING CASES 
Variable proportion ties typically involve a reduction in the price of the 
tying product from its standalone profit-maximizing price, with the monopoly 
overcharge and even part of the competitive return transferred to the tied product. 
Indeed, in many variable proportion ties of complementary products, such as 
printers and ink cartridges, the tying product is priced at or below marginal cost,77 
leaving the monopoly overcharge and even part of the competitive return to be 
earned on the tied product. In some cases the tying product is even sold at a price 
                                                                                                            
  77. See id. at 539 (printer–ink tie; ―As is true of other printer manufacturers, 
Xerox generally sells its printers at a low margin or a loss, hoping to earn a profit through 
later sales of high margin ink.‖). In one of the earliest variable proportion tying cases, 
Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912), the patentee sold its mimeograph machine at 
less than its costs but tied ink, stencils, and other supplies and assessed a high markup on 
those. See A.B. Dick Co. v. Henry, 149 F. 424, 425 (C.C.N.Y. 1907) (―The evidence 
establishes that the complainants sell the machines at a loss, less than the actual cost of 
making, relying on sales of supplies therefor for a profit. The complainants have sold about 
11,000 of these machines under this license restriction.‖); see also Motion Picture Patents 
Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516–17 (1917) (noting patentee‘s argument 
that the public benefitted ―by the sale of the machine at what is practically its cost‖); 
Cortelyou v. Charles Eneu Johnson & Co., 138 F. 110 (C.C.N.Y. 1905), rev’d, 145 F. 933 
(2d Cir. 1906) (tie of patented duplicating machine to stencils: ―The evidence is that the 
present selling price of the rotary neostyle machine is $50, but that its cost to the 
manufacturer is about $64.‖); Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 
77 F. 288, 289 (6th Cir. 1896) (―These machines have been placed in the hands of shoe 
dealers . . . at the actual cost of the machines to the makers, they expecting a profit on their 
monopoly alone from the sale of fasteners or staples to those having the machine.‖); Static 
Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int‘l, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 830 (E.D. Ky. 2007) (printer 
manufacturer received lower price for cartridges subject to a restriction requiring a single use 
and replacement with another Lexmark cartridge than if sold without the restriction); Tony 
Smith, Xbox 360 Costs Third More to Make than It Sells For, REGISTER, Nov. 24, 2005, 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/11/24/xbox360_component_breakdown/ (noting Microsoft‘s 
strategy of below cost sale of hardware game box, accompanied by high prices for Microsoft‘s 
own games plus royalty rates on license fees from independent game producers). In marketing 
this is sometimes called razor + blade pricing, and it applies to goods that are tied by 
technological incompatibility as well as those that are contractually tied. See Wesley R. 
Hartmann & Harikesh Nair, Retail Competition and the Dynamics of Consumer Demand for 
Tied Goods (Dec. 4, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1085009; see also Edward Iacobucci, A 
Switching Costs Explanation of Tying and Warranties, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 431 (2008) 
(describing strategies of using low foremarket prices compensated by high aftermarket 
prices); Christopher Soghoian, Caveat Venditor: Technologically Protected Subsidized 
Goods and the Customers Who Hack Them, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 46 (2007) 
(providing several examples, focusing on technological ties); Richard Gil & Wesley R. 
Hartmann, Why Does Popcorn Cost So Much at the Movies? An Empirical Analysis of 
Metering Price Discrimination (Stanford U. Graduate Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 
1983, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1088451 
(movie theaters tie concession food products by prohibiting attendees from bringing in their 
own; high food prices are offset by lowered admission prices). 
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of zero.78 The result is typically to increase the number of consumers using the 
tying combination, but to decrease the number of units that previously existing 
customers purchased. For example, when a firm ties printers and ink cartridges, 
buyers do less printing on average, because ink costs per page are higher, but the 
number of buyers increases. This is also typically the case under franchise tying, 
where the entry price of the franchise is relatively low or occasionally zero, but the 
tied products (very common staple products or services) are sold at an 
overcharge.79 The result of such arrangements is that many more potential 
franchisees can afford a franchise. The franchisor‘s profits are changed from a 
fixed upfront entry fee to an overcharge that varies with output. As a result, the 
higher the output of the franchise the more profitable it is.80 
IV. VARIABLE PROPORTION TIES: 
A PRELIMINARY WELFARE ANALYSIS 
One misconception about variable proportion ties is that they harm all 
consumers who purchase fewer units of the tied product, and that the only 
consumers who benefit are those who would not purchase either good under untied 
monopoly pricing. It is true that increasing the tied product‘s price reduces the 
surplus consumers obtain on each tied unit from the ―but-for‖ (i.e., nontying) level. 
But consumers‘ surplus is also increased by the reduction in the tying product‘s 
price. Tying affects consumer welfare in two ways. First, the price increase applied 
to the tied product reduces the but-for surplus levels achieved by consumers who 
are willing to buy the goods even under monopoly pricing. This is because 
increasing the tied price is tantamount to increasing the marginal cost of using the 
tying product, which compels most buyers to use the tying product less (i.e., to buy 
                                                                                                            
  78. See, e.g., Kentmaster Mfg. Co. v. Jarvis Prods. Corp., 146 F.3d 691 (9th Cir. 
1998), amended by 164 F.3d 1243 (9th Cir. 1999) (defendant provided durable meat-cutting 
equipment at no charge to meat cutters but charged high prices for aftermarket parts). Compare 
a common distribution mechanism of soft drink dispensing machines, which provides the 
machines to owners of locations where vending occurs at a price of zero, but the machine may 
stock only that supplier‘s brand of soft drinks. See Coke Vending Machine, 
VENDINGSOLUTIONS, http://www.vendingsolutions.com/coke-vending-machines/ (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2010) (Coca-Cola will provide a free dispensing machine to plant locations 
containing forty employees or more, but only Coca-Cola products can be dispensed in the 
machine). 
  79. E.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971) (franchisor 
charged no franchising fee or royalty, but required franchisees to purchase tied products at 
higher-than-market prices). 
  80. See ROGER D. BLAIR & FRANCINE LAFONTAINE, THE ECONOMICS OF 
FRANCHISING, 54–81 (2005) (most upfront franchise fees are very low in relation to value of 
business); Roger D. Blair & David L. Kaserman, Vertical Integration, Tying and Antitrust, 
68 AM. ECON. REV. 397 (1978) (on equivalence of variable proportion tying and vertical 
integration; results in a more optimal use of downstream inputs and probable output 
increases); Benjamin Klein & Lester Saft, The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying 
Contracts, 28 J.L. & ECON. 345, 355 (1985); Steven C. Michael, The Extent, Motivation, 
and Effect of Tying in Franchise Contracts, 21 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 191 (2000) 
(tying in restaurant franchises is less a function of market power than of nature of 
equipment employed); see also Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, Vertical Control with 
Variable Proportions, 82 J. POL. ECON. 783 (1974). 
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fewer tied units). On the other hand, the price of the tying product falls, so that a 
smaller amount of a but-for surplus is subtracted upon buying the tie. Many 
consumers will be better off under tying, even though it causes them to purchase 
fewer tied units.81  
Tying impacts consumers in three different ways depending on their 
status under a non-tying monopoly. First, there are low intensity consumer types 
who buy the two goods under tying, but not under standalone monopoly pricing of 
the tying product. For these consumers the tie is an unambiguous welfare 
improvement; they go from zero surplus to whatever surplus they achieve through 
purchase. Second, there are medium intensity consumer types who achieve more 
consumer surplus under tying even though it leads them to buy fewer units of the 
tied product. This occurs because tying increases their costs for the tied product by 
less than it reduces their costs for the tying product. Finally, there are high 
intensity consumer types who achieve less surplus under tying. For these buyers, 
the price cut applied to the tying good is too small to cover the tie‘s reduction of 
but-for surplus. From the seller‘s side, it generally earns greater surplus from the 
low intensity group, because these are sales that are not made at all prior to tying. 
The seller also earns greater surplus from the high intensity group, because it earns 
more on the higher volume of tied product that they purchase. However, the seller 
loses money on the medium intensity group because the losses on the tying 
product (printer) price cut is greater than the gains on the higher tied product (ink 
cartridges) price. As a result, the tie is profitable and thus will be imposed, if the 
gains from the first and third group exceed the losses from the intermediate group. 
In this situation, the relationship between consumer welfare and output of 
the tied product is uncertain. Unlike situations involving only one good, a 
reduction in output does not imply a reduction in consumer welfare. Welfare can 
increase even though output of the tied product falls, provided that the number of 
medium-intensity consumers is sufficiently large.82 If, on the other hand, output 
levels are maintained or increased, the tie should be assumed to enhance consumer 
welfare unless there is reason to believe that the injuries to high-intensity buyers 
outweigh the improvements obtained by low- and medium-intensity buyers. 
Finally, all this is aside from any realization of production efficiencies that 
commonly attend higher output, which further supports the conclusion that a tie 
increases welfare overall.83 
The one case where a tie will not produce a welfare improvement is when 
the tie fails to serve any low intensity customers. For example, if a printer-ink tie 
increased the price of a single ink cartridge by the same amount that it cut the 
printer‘s price, then a buyer who buys only one ink cartridge is no better off under 
tying. Further, every consumer who buys more than one ink cartridge is worse off, 
because the average cost of printing is higher at all print quantities requiring two or 
more ink cartridges. In this case, tying fails to benefit any consumers, and it leaves 
                                                                                                            
  81. See infra Appendix (showing comprehensive proof and graphical analysis). 
  82. See infra Appendix.  
  83. On the manifold sources of cost savings and product improvement that 
results from ties, see 9 AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & ELHAUGE, supra note 3, ¶¶ 1712–1718. 
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existing customers either indifferent or worse off.84 Such situations are probably 
rare, and they can be distinguished using a simple ―consumer benefit‖ test, which 
asks whether a tie succeeds in serving any low-intensity consumers, who are 
defined to be those who will not buy under monopoly pricing. This test is passed 
whenever output of the tying product increases upon tying or whenever output of 
the tied product does not fall as a consequence of tying, as high- and medium-
intensity buyers will all reduce the number of tied units they purchase and low-
intensity buyers must account for the difference. However, an increase in output of 
the tied product is merely sufficient for passing the consumer benefit test; it is not 
necessary. When a tie passes the consumer benefit test, one can be sure that it 
serves both low- and medium-intensity consumers, though this does not determine 
the proportion of buyers who maintain low- or medium-intensity levels.85  
Graphical analysis of variable proportion ties is somewhat similar to that 
used to illustrate the effects of two-part tariffs. When two-part tariffs are graphed, 
there is typically a lump sum payment that is reflected by some area under the 
demand curve. This payment reduces the consumer surplus received for 
purchasing the good. In the case of variable proportion ties, the tying product‘s 
price is analogous to the lump sum payment used by a two-part tariff.86 
Consider the diagram in Figure 1, which illustrates how consumers 
choose whether or not to buy a printer-ink tie, and how different consumers arrive 
at different decisions: 
Figure 1 
 
                                                                                                            
  84. This is also likely to be true if the manufacturer increases the price of the 
tying good upon tying; however, we have not been able to find any such cases. 
  85. 9 AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & ELHAUGE, supra note 3, ¶¶ 1712–1718. 
  86. See, e.g., VISCUSI, VERNON & HARRINGTON, supra note 67, at 412–16 
(graphical and mathematical illustrations of two-part tariffs). 
946 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 52:925 
Figure 1 indicates the marginal price of a print as given by the price of 
ink,87 plus an assumption about printer costs. The Figure considers two consumer 
types: high intensity and low intensity. The marginal value curves are demand 
curves that reflect consumers‘ optimal print quantities. The price of the printer, 
which is a fixed cost to the consumer, is given by the area of the shaded region, or 
A1 + A2. This area must be subtracted from a consumer‘s but-for surplus, which is 
given by the area under the marginal value curve and above price. (Recall that this 
is the surplus a consumer receives but for the price of the printer.) A consumer‘s 
surplus realization would equal her but-for surplus only if the printer was free, in 
which case the high intensity buyer would earn consumer surplus of A1 + A2 + 
A3. However, when the printer‘s price is subtracted, the high-intensity buyer 
achieves a surplus realization of only A3. This amount is positive, so she will elect 
to buy the tie. Conversely, even at her optimal quantity of prints, the low-intensity 
buyer does not achieve a level of but-for surplus that exceeds the price of the 
printer. The low-intensity buyer will not buy either the printer or the ink. 
Assessing the impact of a tie requires comparison with the untied 
situation—namely, where the printer is sold at its standalone monopoly price and 
ink is priced competitively. We draw this comparison from the perspective of a 
single type of consumer, so that the marginal value curves are the same in both 
situations. Further, we assume the consumer-benefit test is passed, so we can see 
how a consumer might achieve more surplus in spite of purchasing fewer prints. 
Some consumers will benefit, while others are injured. Figure 2 illustrates: 
Figure 2 
 
The printer prices in the monopoly and tying situation are given by the 
areas MP (―monopoly price‖) and TP (―tying price‖), respectively. In the tying 
scenario the price of the printer (TP) is lower than the monopoly price of MP, but 
the price of the ink is higher. Consumers‘ surplus in the two situations is given by 
the respective areas MS and TS, where MS includes the white region above the 
dotted line. Because the price of the ink is the only variable cost, and thus 
equivalent to marginal cost, the consumer purchases less ink under the tying 
arrangement. Nevertheless, from this consumer‘s perspective, the tie is preferable 
                                                                                                            
  87. This is the price of an ink cartridge divided by the number of prints that can 
be produced from one. We ignore the price of paper, electricity, and other collateral inputs. 
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if the area of region TS exceeds that of MS. Thus, as Figure 2 illustrates, a 
consumer can be better off with the tie even if it leads her to consume fewer prints. 
These medium-intensity consumers benefit from the tie because the amount saved 
on the printer exceeds the tie‘s reduction of surplus resulting from higher ink 
prices. 
Comparing the two situations becomes easier when they can be shown in 
a single diagram. This allows one to calculate exactly the welfare transfers that 
take place between the two situations, as Figure 3 illustrates: 
Figure 3 
 
This diagram superimposes the tying situation onto the monopoly 
situation. Before tying is introduced, this buyer earns a consumer surplus of S1 + 
S2. If the printer price under tying decreased by only A3 dollars, the consumer 
would lose S2 in surplus and gain nothing in return. However, if the printer price 
under tying falls by A2 + A3, the consumer receives a surplus of S1 + A2 under 
the tie. Thus, the consumer prefers the tie if A2 is larger than S2, even though she 
buys fewer prints. 
Area A2 is what incentivizes new consumers to buy printers and ink when 
the tie is introduced.88 Upon tying, the consumer‘s but-for surplus on ink purchases 
falls by A3 + S2, while the price of the printer falls by A2 + A3. Because the 
                                                                                                            
  88. Suppose the tied printer price were equal to A1 + A2. In that case, the 
consumer depicted in Figure 3 is necessarily worse off in the tying situation, because she 
loses S2 in surplus and gains none back, even though the price of the printer has fallen by 
A3. For example, suppose that the printer manufacturer cut the price of a printer by $4 but 
increased the price of each cartridge by $4. This tie would reduce output to everyone except 
the person who never used more than the first cartridge, who would be indifferent. 
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difference between but-for surplus and the printer‘s price determines the surplus 
that the consumer realizes, she is better off if A2 > S2. Low intensity consumers 
are those whose marginal value curves run through the area A2, as these are 
defined to be the consumers who buy printers and ink only in the tying situation.  
Finally, Figure 4 depicts a low-intensity consumer. In this diagram the 
monopoly printer price is still equal to the sum of all shaded regions, while the tied 
printer price is still only A1. But this graph illustrates a consumer who achieves a 
positive amount of consumer surplus only in the tying situation. In the monopoly 
situation, the consumer achieves a negative surplus of B2 + C2, and hence does not 
purchase. Under tying, however, the consumer achieves a positive surplus 
realization of B1 and therefore enters the market. It should be noted that all 
consumers whose marginal value curves run through the regions B1 or B2 will buy 
printers and ink only in the tying situation. For them, area B1 is a pure welfare 
gain and there are no offsetting losses. 
Figure 4 
   
We can demonstrate how a tie affects different consumer types differently 
by plotting the surplus realizations under both tying and monopoly pricing, and by 
contrasting them over a continuum of consumer intensity levels. This makes it 
easy to distinguish low-, medium-, and high-intensity consumers and to see how 
each type is affected by tying. 
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Figure 5 
 
In Figure 5, the dashed curve represents surplus under monopoly pricing, 
while the solid curve represents surplus under tying. The horizontal axis plots 
consumer intensity levels, increasing as one moves from the origin to the right. 
The solid curve lies above the dashed curve over the ranges of low- and medium- 
intensity buyers, which reflects the fact that both of these types benefit from tying. 
Conversely, the dashed curve is highest over the range of high intensity buyers, as 
these consumers are injured by the tie. Every tie that passes the consumer-benefit 
test will produce a graph similar to this, because the test is used to demonstrate that 
low- and medium- intensity consumers are served by the tie. If the tie failed to pass 
the consumer-benefit test, the solid curve would not intersect the horizontal axis at 
a lower intensity level than the dashed curve, and the dashed curve would be above 
the solid curve at all intensity levels above zero. This is because, when a tie fails 
the consumer benefit test, no consumers are better off and most are injured. By 
contrast, when a tie passes the consumer benefit test, it necessarily increases the 
output of the tying product. 
Figure 5 does not account for how many buyers or how many purchases 
are at each intensity level or, more importantly, how aggregate welfare is affected 
by a tie. In general, showing whether a tie that passes the consumer benefit test is a 
net benefit or a net harm to consumers is extremely difficult. If buyers are 
sufficiently concentrated at low- and medium- intensity levels, then their 
consumers‘ surplus gains will outweigh the consumers‘ surplus losses derived 
from high-intensity buyers. Moreover, if buyers are sufficiently concentrated over 
the range of medium intensity levels, then it is possible that consumer welfare 
increases and yet output of the tied product falls. If output of the tied product 
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increases as a result of the tie, one can be sure that there are significant numbers of 
buyers in the low intensity range. Their entirely new purchases of the tied product 
outweigh reduction in consumption by high-intensity buyers. This indicates that 
numerous consumers benefit from tying. 
Unfortunately, an antitrust tribunal will almost never have information 
about how consumers are distributed over the various intensity levels. As a result, 
welfare effects are probably unclear unless the gains are clearly positive among all 
three groupings. This could happen in a situation in which all existing users benefit 
from the tie because the price cut in the tying product is greater for each of them 
than the price increase in the tied product. This would be most likely to occur 
when the price cut on the tying product is significant, the price increase on the tied 
product is fairly modest, and the tie brought in a large number of new tying-
product customers.
89
 
Incidentally, the assumption that medium-intensity consumers are costly 
to the manufacturer assumes that the tie itself does not yield any production 
efficiencies from economies of scale or economies of joint provision of the tying 
and tied product. To the extent that a reduced printer price reflects reduced printer 
production costs when printers are tied, medium-intensity consumers could be 
better off and those sales could be profitable to the manufacturer. For example, if 
tying increased the volume of printers substantially, reducing costs by, say, $40 
per printer, then a $100 price cut to the buyer would represent only a $60 net 
revenue loss to the seller. Then, if medium-intensity buyers contribute more than 
$60 in profits upon buying ink cartridges, these customers will have become more 
profitable under the tie. That is, medium-intensity consumers would be profitable 
to the tying firm even though they buy fewer tied units and achieve more consumer 
surplus. 
If the tying product is sold at cost under tying, then a small fraction of 
high-intensity consumers may also be less profitable under tying, while the rest 
increase the manufacturer‘s profits.90 All of the low-intensity consumers are more 
profitable under tying, because they do not purchase the tying product at all under 
monopoly pricing. Importantly, depending on how customers are distributed 
among different intensity levels, it is possible that a tie increases profits and 
improves consumer welfare and yet fails to increase output of the tied product. 
This is because a consumer‘s profitability does not stipulate the way in which 
                                                                                                            
  89. In such a case, the seller would be losing money from all existing customers 
but earning additional profits from all customers brought into the market by the tie. That 
situation would create a gain to everyone—i.e., all customers who purchased the tying 
product previously, all new customers who come into the market in response to the tying 
product price cut, and the manufacturer. It would increase both general welfare and 
consumer welfare. 
For example, suppose the monopoly price of the printer is $200, and the tying price is 
$100. When the manufacturer ties, it also increases the cartridge price from $8 to $10. Over 
the life of the tying product, the ―break even‖ point for all prior users would be fifty units of 
the tied product; for new customers, every one is profitable to the seller. If they are 
sufficiently numerous, the gains they produce for the manufacturer could easily exceed the 
losses from the preexisting users. 
  90. See infra Appendix. 
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tying affects her surplus or the number of tied units she buys; there is significant 
ambiguity in the relationships between profits, welfare, and output of the tied 
product. For example, some profitable consumers buy more tied units and achieve 
more surplus under tying (low-intensity buyers), while others buy fewer tied units 
and achieve less surplus (high-intensity buyers). On the other hand, all 
unprofitable consumers buy fewer tied units under tying, but some achieve more 
surplus (medium-intensity buyers), while others achieve less (high-intensity 
buyers). In sum, a tie that reduces output could increase consumer welfare, while 
one that increases output could reduce consumer welfare. 
Some price discrimination strategies permit a ready assessment of welfare 
effects, because output levels typically serve as an indicator of consumer welfare. 
For example, third-degree price discrimination that fails to increase output reduces 
welfare.
91
 Variable proportion tying presents an unusual challenge, because some 
consumers will typically benefit from it even though they purchase fewer tied 
units. Observing changes in the output of the tying product is equally unhelpful. 
Indeed, output of the tying product will increase under any tie that benefits at least 
one consumer (i.e., any tie that passes the consumer benefit test). 
By contrast, output effects in the tied market may serve to make certain 
welfare effects more likely than others. The fact that a tie increases the output of 
the tied product indicates that low-intensity customers brought into the market by 
the tie purchase more tied units than are given up by medium- and high-intensity 
customers. This implies that a large portion of consumers are necessarily better off 
under the tie. As such, the tie should be presumed to increase welfare unless there 
is reason to believe that high-intensity buyers lose more surplus than is gained by 
low- and medium-intensity ones. 
On the other hand, when tied product output is unchanged or decreased, 
there is no necessary reason to believe the tie reduces consumer welfare. A tied 
product output reduction suggests only that there are relatively few low-intensity 
buyers, but this does not indicate that they are more concentrated at high intensity 
levels than medium intensity levels, or vice versa. As such, there is still no reason 
to believe that high-intensity customers lose more surplus than is gained by the 
low- and medium-intensity ones. So the consumer-welfare effects of ties that 
reduce or maintain output levels should generally be considered ambiguous. In 
fact, the only ties that can be categorically shown to harm consumer welfare are 
those that fail the consumer-benefit test, which means that they do not benefit any 
consumers at all. 
To summarize, under a variable proportion tie of printers and ink 
cartridges that passes the consumer-benefit test: 
• Low-intensity consumers will begin buying under the tie, though they 
would not buy either good under monopoly pricing; for new customers 
brought into the market by the tie, the result is an unambiguous 
increase in consumer surplus. 
                                                                                                            
  91. See discussion and sources cited supra note 16. 
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 • Both medium- and high-intensity users buy fewer ink cartridges than 
under monopoly pricing, but medium-intensity buyers achieve more 
surplus under tying, while high-intensity buyers are injured by the tie; 
the medium-intensity buyers experience greater gains from the tying 
product price reduction than losses from the tied product price increase. 
This is most likely to occur when the tying product has a relatively 
short life, and there is a significant variation in customer intensity of 
use.92 
• Whether the tie increases or decreases consumer welfare depends on the 
distribution of buyers among the three intensity levels. This ambiguity 
still exists if output of the ink cartridges falls, because medium intensity 
buyers buy fewer ink cartridges and are nevertheless benefitted by the 
tie. Rather, a decrease in ink sales implies only that there is a low 
concentration of low-intensity buyers. Welfare could still increase if 
medium-intensity buyers are relatively concentrated. 
 • And, of course, since the firm will not tie unless it earns more by doing 
so, producer surplus increases as well. The seller gains by tying from 
both the low-intensity buyers, who do not buy at all under the tie, and 
the high-intensity buyers, who now pay more for ink. The seller loses 
from the medium-intensity buyers because, for them, the cut in the 
printer price exceeds the increased profits on the ink cartridge price. As 
a result, tying is profitable if the gains from the high- and low-intensity 
group exceed the losses from the medium-intensity group. 
V. EX ANTE VS. EX POST EFFECTS AND THE ROLE OF FIXED COSTS 
To this point we have considered the welfare effects of ties of technology 
or products that have already been developed. The effects are ex post, in the sense 
that they take the status of products as given and compare the effects of tying and 
not-tying. In order to evaluate the full welfare effects of tying, however, one may 
have to step back prior to the development of the product innovations that give rise 
to tying.93 The argument that harm is more apparent when viewed ex ante is that 
firms in search of monopoly power will be willing to devote significant resources 
to the development of innovations that enable them to capture monopoly returns.94 
Further, under competition to innovate, investment in innovation may be excessive 
in that many firms needlessly race to develop some new product, thereby 
duplicating efforts, but only one takes the patent prize.95 Innovation races can 
                                                                                                            
  92. See, e.g., Xerox Corp. v. Media Scis., Inc., 660 F. Supp. 2d 535, 539–40, 542 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (observing that Xerox sells printers at or below cost and hopes to make up 
difference on high margin ink, that the printer has useful life of three years, and that 
consumers tend to be very savvy about life-cycle costs). 
  93. See Elhauge, supra note 6, at 440–42. 
  94. This argument is well developed in the literature on rent seeking. See 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, § 1.3c; Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s Protected Classes, 88 
MICH. L. REV. 1 (1989); Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 
83 J. POL. ECON. 807, 807 (1975). 
  95. Elhauge, supra note 6, at 440 (citing SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND 
INCENTIVES 100–03 (2004)) (arguing that investment will be excessive because firms will 
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indeed be wasteful, and this explains why research and development (R&D) joint 
ventures are often socially valuable: they permit firms to share the cost of 
innovating.96 
The argument that an ex ante view of innovation itself shows greater 
social harm than an ex post view is that too much of the surplus that flows from 
innovation goes to the manufacturers themselves rather than consumers, and it is 
this excess surplus that induces this wasteful competition.97 Clearly, however, an 
optimal intellectual property policy does not require that innovators be able to 
capture the total surplus produced by their innovations.98 If that were true, then 
innovation policy would benefit only innovators, not everyone else. The correct 
amount of return to innovation is just enough to give the innovator the ex ante 
incentive to innovate in the first place.99  
The particular corollary to this argument that applies to tying 
arrangements that result from new products is that such ties increase the extraction 
of consumers‘ surplus, thereby increasing the social cost of innovation.100 But the 
argument confuses increased expected profits to the innovator with the extraction 
of increased consumer surplus. To be sure, an innovator can earn more if it can 
extract more surplus from consumers. But it can also earn more by reducing the 
cost of the product it is developing or by increasing its output. Both of these 
methods can increase the innovator‘s returns even as consumer surplus is increased 
as well, and for reasons additional to the economies of joint provision that most 
tying arrangements create.  
Ignoring for the moment all economies of joint production or distribution, 
ties can increase a firm‘s profits, and thus the expected profits of an innovation 
that involves tying, in three ways. First, they increase tying and tied product 
output. Second, if fixed costs are significant, the higher output will result in lower 
                                                                                                            
continue investing in innovation until private costs reach private gains, which is greater than 
the amount needed to equalize private social gains); Partha Dasgupta & Joseph Stiglitz, 
Uncertainty, Industrial Structure, and the Speed of R&D, 11 BELL J. ECON. 1, 18 (1980); 
Pankaj Tandon, Rivalry and the Excessive Allocation of Resources to Research, 14 BELL J. 
ECON. 152, 152, 156–57 (1983). The extent of wasteful investment very likely varies 
considerably from one industry to another, depending on whether patent duration and scope 
are too little, just right, or too much for that particular industry. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. 
Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1577 (2003); see also Mark A. 
Lemley, Ex Ante vs. Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129 
(2004) (critiquing ex ante argument because it largely ignores the social value of 
competition for new innovation). 
  96. See 13 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 2100, 2115, 2136 (2d ed. 
2005); see also SCOTCHMER, supra note 95, at 172–75 (discussing the economics of joint 
ventures). 
  97. Elhauge, supra note 6, at 440. 
  98. See id. at 439–40 & n.114 (citing Dennis W. Carlton & Ken Heyer, 
Extraction v. Extension: The Basis for Formulating Antitrust Policy Towards Single-Firm 
Conduct, 4 COMPETITION POL‘Y INT‘L 285, 285, 292–93 (2008)). 
  99. See Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: 
Reformation and Harm, 51 B. C. L. REV. 905 (2010); see also Brett M. Frischmann & Mark 
A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007). 
  100. Elhauge, supra note 6, at 440. 
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per unit production costs, which is a pure welfare gain. Indeed, it is the very type 
of gain that Professor Elhauge cites as important when he talks about the social 
costs of excessive innovation.101 The cost of innovation is measured in dollars per 
unit of output, not in dollars per innovator. Thus, as output increases, relevant 
costs decrease. Third, such ties typically result in a revenue-producing price 
increase in the tied product, although typically not an output reduction.102 
 It is important not to confuse higher producer returns with extraction of 
consumer surplus. Which of the three elements of profit just described results from 
extraction of wealth from consumers? Clearly it is not the increase in tying product 
output, which results from the price reduction in the tying product. Every 
consumer benefits from that price reduction: intense users pay less for the tying 
product; less intense users who come into the market in response to the tie go from 
zero surplus to their value for the tying product less its price. The reduction in per 
unit fixed costs also does not result from extraction of wealth from consumers, as 
it is universally a boon to consumers. In virtually every case, a monopolist who 
experiences a reduction in the cost of a product will pass at least a portion of that 
reduction on to consumers, making that cost reduction a strong consumer benefit. 
Finally, the profits that result from higher tied product prices also are not the result 
of extraction of wealth from consumers. Ordinarily, higher prices injure 
consumers, but those higher prices are also ordinarily accompanied by an output 
reduction. In this case, tied product output may actually increase, given that 
consumers who were not in the market at all until the tie took hold have entered.  
Further, as noted above, the story of consumer surplus is complex. First, 
high intensity users are injured because they pay more for the tied product than the 
offsetting reduction in the price of the tying product. Second, other customers who 
were in the market both before and after tying took effect benefit because the price 
reduction in the tying product more than offset the higher tied product price.103 
Third, for all the customers who were not in the market prior to tying, sales of the 
tied product produce a benefit no matter what its price. As noted above, it is 
incorrect to conclude that the tie systematically transfers surplus from high-value 
to low-value users; all customers purchase the tying/tied product to the point that 
their marginal valuation falls to the price of the incremental unit, and that is the 
same for everyone.
104
 
So when ties are considered ex ante rather than ex post, there is no 
support for thinking that they harm consumers. Ex ante implies taking long run 
concerns into account, and then it becomes critical not to overlook the very 
important role of fixed costs, which are typically quite high in the research-
intensive markets that are subject to variable proportion ties.105 A common feature 
                                                                                                            
101. Id. 
102. That is, to the extent the lower tying product price brings more customers 
into the market, tied market output will go up rather than down. 
103. See supra text accompanying notes 78–79. 
104. See supra text accompanying notes 57–58. 
105. Professor Elhauge‘s analysis ignores fixed costs, mentioning them only in 
relation to the possibility that fixed costs in the tied product market are a barrier to entry. 
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of markets subject to tying is intellectual property rights, and a very common 
feature of a market with a significant intellectual property component is substantial 
fixed costs. Looking ex ante, even in the absence of any joint costs or other 
production efficiencies that might result from tying, a firm will have an incentive 
to tie when the impact is to increase the output of affected products, thus reducing 
per-unit costs and permitting the monopolist to charge a lower price.  
The larger upfront innovation costs are in relation to production (variable) 
costs, the more sensitive the final product‘s price will be to the output rate. For 
instance, suppose Kodak is working on the project that will become the instamatic-
camera-film-cartridge package, a famous technological tie.106 If Kodak simply put 
the camera on the market at its profit-maximizing price and let others make the 
film without royalty, Kodak could expect to sell one million cameras. However, if 
it can tie the camera and film, transferring part of the camera price to the film, it 
can cut the price of the camera to the competitive level and earn the same amount 
or more. But in this case—assuming a demand elasticity of one—it will sell two 
million cameras.107 Fixed costs of the project are $20 million, and production costs 
are $3 per camera. The break-even price of the camera without the tie will be $23 
($20 in recovery of R&D costs and $3 in production costs). The break-even price 
of the camera with the tie will be $13. These numbers understate the price 
difference because in the absence of the tie the monopolist will not be selling the 
camera at cost, but at a substantial monopoly overcharge. In other words, if fixed 
R&D costs are substantial, the inability to tie will decrease the returns to invention 
considerably, most significantly by reducing the number of customers who will 
purchase the innovated product. To be sure, if patent scope or duration is excessive 
there could still be too much investment in innovation. That is not an argument 
against tying, however, but rather in favor of patent reform. Indeed, the perverse 
quality of Professor Elhauge‘s argument is that it treats more valuable products as 
more socially costly to innovate no matter what the source of the increased value, 
tying or otherwise.108 
More relevant for antitrust policy, any time one compares ex ante and ex 
post environments a theory of tying that neglects fixed costs is likely to severely 
exaggerate consumer harm.109 It is hardly a coincidence that many variable 
proportion ties involving durable tying products occur in markets that are subject 
                                                                                                            
Elhauge, supra note 6, at 41 (citing Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and 
Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837, 840, 846 (1990)). 
106. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979). 
107. If the demand curve is linear, output at the competitive price is double output 
at the monopoly price. Alan A. Fisher, Robert H. Lande & Walter Vandaele, Afterword: 
Could a Merger Lead to Both a Monopoly and a Lower Price?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1697, 
1699 (1983). As a result, a monopolist that tied while reducing the tying product price to the 
competitive level would double its tying product sales. 
108. For example, if a 10% increase in innovative effort will produce a 25% 
increase in product value, the investment sounds like a good one for a single innovator, but 
would be wasteful if three or more innovators were racing to claim a prize that only one of 
them could win. 
109. Cf. Posner, supra note 60, at 236 (observing that price discrimination ties are 
more likely to be welfare enhancing as the proportion of fixed costs rises, and that this is 
particularly true of intellectual property rights). 
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to significant research and development costs as well as relatively short production 
runs (quick obsolescence). This could include computers, printers, and medical 
devices. Ties in these markets can dramatically increase output of the tying 
product, leading to equally dramatic reductions in primary product costs. The 
impact of fixed costs is also likely to be large for franchise ties.110 In franchising, 
the franchisor‘s fixed costs typically include various intellectual property rights 
and a business method. By tying and building the overcharge into the tied 
products, the franchisor typically reduces the size of the upfront franchise fee 
considerably, sometimes even to zero. The result is that many more franchise 
locations are opened. The fixed costs can then be amortized across all these 
franchises, and their increased output yields a lower profit-maximizing product 
price. 
VI. THE PROBLEM OF DIFFERENTIAL CONSUMER PREFERENCES 
Price discrimination from variable proportion ties is one area where ties 
create ambiguous effects on consumers. Professor Elhauge mentions several other 
situations where he believes some kind of leverage is possible. While all of these 
are well developed in the literature on tying,111 none affords any general basis for 
believing that a class of nonforeclosing ties reduces either general welfare or 
consumer welfare, although one can assume particular sets of numbers in which 
that might occur. As Professor Elhauge notes, foreclosing ties, which are ties that 
exclude or injure rivals in the tied product market, can cause competitive harm 
under a set of well-established theories.112 However, the rules he proposes to 
preclude this harm would also condemn many nonforeclosing ties.113 
For example, fixed proportion tying of two goods when the dominant firm 
has at least some market power in both can lead to a kind of ―simulated price 
discrimination‖ if the seller can take advantage of differential preferences that 
customers have for the two different goods. The standard example in the literature 
is ―block booking‖ of motion pictures, where different theaters may place different 
values on different movies in the block.114 The tying occurs because the 
                                                                                                            
110. E.g., Kypta v. McDonald‘s Corp., 671 F.2d 1282 (11th Cir. 1982); Siegel v. 
Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971); Little Caesar Enters., Inc. v. Smith, 34 F. 
Supp. 2d 459 (E.D. Mich. 1998). 
111. See 9 AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & ELHAUGE, supra note 3, ¶ 1706 (sequential 
monopoly); id. ¶ 1710 (intensified exploitation of preexisting market power); id. ¶ 1711 
(price discrimination). 
112. See Elhauge, supra note 6, at 417. On antitrust harm from tying caused by 
market foreclosure effects, see 9 AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & ELHAUGE, supra note 3, ¶ 1704, 
and HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, § 10.6b. See also Daniel A. Crane & Graciela M. 
Murciego, Toward a Unified Theory of Exclusionary Vertical Restraints (Univ. of Mich. 
Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 24, 2010), available at http://law.bepress.com/ 
umichlwps/empirical/art24 (arguing that foreclosure is the only anticompetitive rationale for 
exclusionary vertical restraints). 
113. See Elhauge, supra note 6, at 399. 
114. See United States v. Loew‘s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); HOVENKAMP, supra 
note 21, § 10.6e; George J. Stigler, United States v. Loew‘s Inc.: A Note on Block-Booking, 
1963 SUP. CT. REV. 152; see also William James Adams & Janet L. Yellen, Commodity 
Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly, 90 Q.J. ECON. 475 (1976); R. Preston McAfee et al., 
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monopolist licenses the films in ―blocks‖ rather than individually. The theory can 
work with any product. 
One important fact about such a practice, however, is that it can be output 
increasing and actually improve consumer welfare, depending on the nature of 
customer demand. To illustrate, suppose a monopolist has two products, Alpha and 
Beta and that their costs are zero. Two customers want both products and are 
willing to pay more than cost, but their willingness to pay varies between the two, 
as shown in Table 2: 
Table 2 
Willingness to Pay 
 Alpha Beta 
Customer 1 10 5 
Customer 2 3 11 
 
In this case, the optimal strategy for the dominant firm is to package the 
two products together at a price of 14 and sell both products to both customers. 
The seller‘s surplus is 28. Customer 1‘s surplus is 1; Customer 2‘s surplus is 0. 
Now suppose that tying and bundled discounting are forbidden, which 
means that the seller must set a price for Alpha and Beta individually. One choice 
would be for the seller to set a price of 10 for Alpha and 11 for Beta. In that case 
only Customer 1 would purchase Alpha and only Customer 2 would purchase 
Beta. So the seller‘s surplus would be 21; and the customers‘ surplus would be 0. 
Alternatively, the seller could charge a price of 3 for Alpha and 5 for 
Beta. In this case, both customers would purchase both products. The seller‘s 
surplus would be 16. Customer 1 would have a consumer surplus of 7 and 
Customer 2 would have a consumer surplus of 6. Total consumer surplus would be 
13. 
These outcomes can vary depending on the strength and direction of the 
buyers‘ preferences and also on the seller‘s costs.115 But the important thing to 
note in this case is that if tying were not an option, a rational seller would take the 
first choice above, giving itself returns of 21 and customers a surplus of zero. If 
bundling were permitted, though, the seller‘s returns would increase to 28, and 
consumers‘ surplus would also increase from zero to 1. That is to say, not only 
would the tying in this case increase total welfare, but it would also increase 
consumers‘ surplus. 
To be sure, we might prefer the more ―competitive‖ outcome in which the 
monopolist made the separate sales at the lower prices to both customers. But a 
rational seller in our example would not do that. We could reach that outcome only 
                                                                                                            
Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values, 104 Q.J. ECON. 
371 (1989); Richard Schmalensee, Gaussian Demand and Commodity Bundling, 57 J. BUS. 
S211 (1984). 
115. Professor Elhauge gives an example in which consumers‘ surplus is reduced. 
Elhauge, supra note 6, at 406. 
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by regulating the seller‘s prices in addition to preventing it from tying. So in this 
case, a simple rule forbidding tying would reduce welfare (the sum of producer‘s 
and consumers‘ surplus) by 8, and it would also reduce consumers‘ surplus by 1. 
Despite the welfare benefits of the tie, this bundle would be unlawful under 
Professor Elhauge‘s quasi per se rule.116 
The illustration also indicates a common theme in tying law: the 
increased profits very often come from increased output. In the film example 
involving a fixed-proportion tie, just as in the general discussion of variable 
proportion ties above, tying often increases output. When tying increases output of 
either the tying or the tied product,117 then increases in both general welfare and 
consumer welfare are likely, although certainly not invariable. That makes any 
kind of per se rule or quasi per se rule118 that looks exclusively at tying power 
rather than market foreclosure inappropriate. 
VII. DOUBLE MARGINALIZATION AND “REVERSE LEVERAGING” 
Any discussion of tying and leverage must consider the effects of double 
marginalization, which in fact makes many ties serve as ―reverse leveraging‖ 
mechanisms. Double marginalization occurs when complementary goods or 
services are both sold in less-than-perfectly competitive markets and the two 
sellers are not able to coordinate their output to the joint maximizing level. The 
classic case involves vertical integration, in which both an upstream and a 
downstream firm have some measure of market power.119 The first firm, perhaps a 
manufacturer, computes its monopoly output and price by equating marginal cost 
and marginal revenue. The second firm, perhaps a retailer which also has some 
market power, purchases from the manufacturer at this monopoly price and then 
equates its own marginal cost and marginal revenue, in the process adding on yet 
another monopoly markup. The result is even lower output and higher prices. One 
solution that benefits both the manufacturer and consumers is for the manufacturer 
to integrate forward and combine manufacturing and retailing services, thus 
reducing the number of markups from two to one. As a result, elimination of 
double marginalization is a procompetitive rationale for vertical mergers in 
relatively concentrated markets.120 Double marginalization can occur both when 
the proportions of sales in the two markets are fixed and when they are variable,
121
 
                                                                                                            
116. See Elhauge, supra note 6, at 399, 402 (quasi per se rule unless the products 
are sold in a fixed ratio and lack separate utility; in our example the products are sold in a 
fixed ratio, but they have separate utility). 
117. In the film example, supra, which is the tying and which is the tied product is 
difficult to say. Neither product is ―unwanted,‖ although the firms value them by different 
amounts. 
118. See Elhauge, supra note 6, at 399, 402, 420–21 (arguing for a ―quasi per se 
rule‖ for certain classes of ties). 
119. See VISCUSI, VERNON & HARRINGTON, supra note 67, at 238–41. 
120. See 4A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 40,  ¶ 1022. 
121. For example, if a monopoly gasoline refiner is selling to gasoline stations 
that have formed a cartel and are extracting a high markup, the refiner can eliminate the 
markup and benefit both itself and consumers, even though different members of the cartel 
sell different amounts of gasoline. See James L. Hamilton & Ibrahim Mqasqas, Double 
Marginalization and Vertical Integration: New Lessons from Extensions of the Classic 
2010] TYING ARRANGEMENTS 959 
so the consumer welfare savings that result from elimination of double 
marginalization applies to both. 
Double marginalization problems are not limited to vertical integration. 
They can also arise when two different firms sell complementary products and are 
unable to coordinate their output.122 In that case, a single firm selling both will 
charge a lower price than two different firms, each having market power in one of 
the two goods. The tie (or package discount) is necessary because single sales at 
the competitive price would force the firm to forgo its markup. 
For example, suppose that most authors prefer to have both a dictionary 
and a thesaurus, and both are sold in an imperfectly competitive market, such as an 
oligopoly. A dictionary costs $10 to make, a thesaurus costs $8 to make, and the 
profit-maximizing price of a bundle is $20. Different firms selling the two 
products would each try to capture the overcharge. For example, the dictionary 
maker might charge $12 on the theory that the thesaurus maker would charge $8. 
But the thesaurus maker would charge $10 on the assumption that the dictionary 
maker would charge $10 as well. That outcome, which would yield a package 
price of $22, is suboptimal for everyone. Fewer consumers would buy and those 
who did would pay too much. Output for both the dictionary maker and the 
thesaurus maker would fall below the profit-maximizing level. In this case, 
consumer welfare would increase if a single firm sold both the dictionary and the 
thesaurus for a package price of $20, which would also be that firm‘s profit-
maximizing level. The firm could either package the two together at a price of $20, 
or it could sell each separately at prices of $12 and $10 respectively and also 
bundle them at a discounted price of $20.123 
                                                                                                            
Case, 62 S. ECON. J. 567, 581–84 (1996); Michael Waterson, Vertical Integration, Variable 
Proportions and Oligopoly, 92 ECON. J. 129 (1982). 
122. This is sometimes known as the ―Cournot complements‖ problem because it 
is derived from Cournot‘s analysis of pricing by firms that produce complements rather than 
substitutes. See AUGUSTIN A. COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES 
OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH 99–116 (Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., Macmillan 1897) (1838); 
see also Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Francesco Parisi, Substituting Complements, 2 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 333 (2006); Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Harvard, Chicago and 
Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust Analysis, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. (forthcoming 
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1592476. 
123. See generally Bruce H. Kobayashi, Does Economics Provide a Reliable 
Guide to Regulating Commodity Bundling by Firms? A Survey of the Economic Literature, 
1 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 707, 708 (2005); J.J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antiturst 
Policy, 58 J. POL. ECON. 347 (1950). The issue became relevant during hearings over the 
proposed breakup of Microsoft into an operating system company and an applications 
company, where a widely offered criticism was that offering of complementary products by 
two firms would have led to lower output and higher prices than if a single firm offered 
them together. See Richard J. Gilbert & Michael L. Katz, An Economist’s Guide to U.S. v. 
Microsoft, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 25, 41 (2001) (―[T]he sum of the operating system and 
application prices set by an integrated monopolist will be lower than the sum of those prices 
when set separately by two independent firms each with significant market power.‖); Stan J. 
Liebowitz, An Expensive Pig in a Poke: Estimating the Cost of the District Court’s 
Proposed Breakup of Microsoft, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 727 (2001); Giuseppe Dari-
Mattiacci and Francesco Parisi, Substituting Complements, 2 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 1 (2006); 
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As in the block-booking case above, a rule condemning tying would 
reduce both producer and consumers‘ surplus unless the court also forced the firms 
to charge less than their individual profit-maximizing prices. One might assume 
that the dictionary maker could charge $12 for the dictionary and separately sell 
the thesaurus at the marginal cost price of $8. But this result would be no better 
than bundling, and the seller could not be expected to do it, because some buyers 
would purchase its thesaurus at the competitive price and then go elsewhere for 
their $12 dictionary. This result very likely explains many bundled discounts that 
occur in markets where the rival is operating in an oligopoly market and enjoying 
fairly high markups—a common characteristic of even modestly concentrated 
American markets.124 The firm making the two products sells them individually at 
the single-product oligopoly price, but bundles them at a profit-maximizing price 
that is lower than the sum of the individual profit-maximizing prices when offered 
by different firms.125 
Results similar to this are reasonably likely whenever both the tying and 
tied markets are subject to pricing above the competitive level and sufficient 
coordination between producers of complements is unlikely—although even 
coordination would very likely take the form of tying.126 The markets need not be 
monopolized. As a result, the savings from elimination of double marginalization 
can apply to almost any market in which the tied product is not a commodity sold 
at the competitive price. In such markets the profit-maximizing price of the tying 
monopolist is actually lower than that of two firms independently selling the tying 
and tied products.127 Once again, however, Professor Elhauge‘s quasi per se rule 
would appear to condemn the tie.128 A better rule would be presumptive legality 
for any tie linking two markets that are not highly competitive, with illegality 
found only in cases of provable foreclosure. 
Ties that at first glance appear to be accompanied by price increases in 
the tying product are also used to control double marginalization. Such ties are, in 
fact, two-part tariffs, in which the seller charges a fixed price for one component 
and then sells a linked component at a competitive price. For example, suppose a 
firm has significant market power in its fuel efficient car, which is best distributed 
by independent dealers, many of which have power in their local markets. If the 
seller charges its monopoly price to the dealers they will assess a second markup to 
                                                                                                            
R. Venkatesh & W. Kamakura, Optimal Bundling and Pricing Under a Monopoly: 
Contrasting Complements and Substitutes from Independently Valued Products, 76 J. BUS. 
211 (2003). 
124. See Robert E. Hall, The Relation Between Price and Marginal Cost in U.S. 
Industry, 96 J. POL. ECON. 921, 946 (1988). 
125. See, e.g., Masimo Corp. v. Tyco Health Care Grp., L.P., No. CV 02-4770 
MRP, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26916, at *27 (C.D. Cal. June 9, 2004) (plaintiff challenging 
defendant‘s discount practices, which included bundled discounts, had profit margins of 
between 45% and 83% during the period of claimed exclusion). The Ninth Circuit 
eventually entered an order finding liability on some claims but not others. Masimo Corp. v. 
Tyco Health Care Grp., L.P., 350 Fed. Appx. 95 (9th Cir. 2009). 
126. For example, a dictionary maker and a thesaurus maker could sell packages 
jointly, agreeing on how to divide the surplus. 
127.  Hovenkamp, supra note 122. 
128. See Elhauge, supra note 6, at 399, 402, 420–21. 
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their customers, producing double marginalization, reduced output, and higher 
prices. Suppose, however, that the manufacturer builds the monopoly upcharge 
into a fixed franchise fee and then sells the cars to the dealers at the competitive 
price. In this case the dealer will still take its markup, but that will reflect only its 
own power and not that of the manufacturer. Further, because the franchise fee is a 
fixed cost to the dealer, the dealer can earn more by increasing the volume of cars 
sold in the time period covered by the fee.129 The term ―tying‖ is apt because the 
manufacturer will not sell the cars at this price to those who have not paid the fee. 
That is to say, the competitively priced cars are the tying product while the 
franchise fee is the tied product. The impact of tying in this case is higher output 
and lower car prices than would occur if the manufacturer simply sold the cars at 
wholesale at its profit-maximizing price. 
VIII. BUNDLED DISCOUNTS: 
EFFECT OF PRICE INCREASE IN MONOPOLY PRODUCT 
A bundled discount, which is closely related to a tie, occurs when a firm 
offers a discount in exchange for purchase of goods in a bundle rather than a 
simple refusal to sell the goods in unbundled form. Today many courts apply a 
cost-based test for bundled discounts that considers whether an equally efficient 
rival that made only one of the products in the bundle is able to match the 
discount.130 The test, which has come to be known as the ―attribution‖ test, 
attributes the entire discount to the good for which exclusion is claimed and then 
considers whether the resulting price for that good would be greater than the 
defendant‘s costs for that good.131 
For example, suppose a firm sells Alpha and Beta at separate prices of $8 
and $6, respectively, but offers them in a bundle at a price of $12. In that case the 
discount is $2, and one would simply ask whether the rival could sell the second 
product at a price of $4. If so, then customers could purchase Alpha from the 
monopolist at an undiscounted price of $8 and Beta from the rival at a price of $4. 
The rival, if equally efficient, could match the discount. A quicker way of getting 
the same result is to ask whether the incremental price of the bundle, when the 
second good is included, is sufficient to cover the costs of adding the second good 
to the bundle. In the above example, under the discount the price goes from $8 to 
                                                                                                            
129. See TIROLE, supra note 29, at 174–76 (noting that the theory is very general); 
see also David Gilo, Retail Competition Percolating Through to Suppliers and the Use of 
Vertical Integration, Tying and Vertical Restraints to Stop It, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 25, 54 
(2003) (use of tying to limit double marginalization); Sreya Kolay & Greg Shaffer, 
Bundling and Menus of Two-Part Tariffs, 51 J. INDUS. ECON. 383 (2003) (comparing 
bundling and two-part tariffs). Microsoft uses such a strategy to keep computer makers from 
assessing too high a markup on its Windows operating system. See Michael P. Akemann, 
Microsoft’s Licensing Agreements: Theory and Evidence on the Sale of MS-DOS and 
Windows, 24 J. CORP. L. 553, 561 (1999). 
130. See, e.g., Cascade Health Solutions v. Peacehealth, 515 F.3d 883, 906 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (taking this approach); accord Southeast Mo. Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 616 F.3d 
888 (8th Cir. 2010). 
131. Cascade, 515 F.3d at 906–07 (quoting 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra 
note 40, at ¶ 749); Bard, 616 F.3d at 893 (same). 
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$12 when the second good is included, so the test queries whether the $4 
increment is sufficient to cover the incremental costs of including Beta in the 
bundle. The rationale for these tests is similar to the rationale for cost-based rules 
of predatory pricing: we want to protect equally efficient rivals against below cost 
price cuts, but we do not want to force firms to keep prices unreasonably high in 
order to protect less efficient rivals.132 
Professor Elhauge opposes the attribution test, arguing that it permits 
dominant firms to force rivals‘ output so low that it denies them economies of 
scale.133 He is particularly suspicious that bundled discounts are often not 
discounts at all because at the time the bundle is introduced the monopolist also 
raises the price of the primary product.134 As a result the bundled price does not 
reflect a true discount from but-for prices or the prices that would have prevailed 
absent the bundle. He would apply a quasi per se rule to bundled discounts in such 
cases.135 
It is true that a bundled discount may acquire greater exclusionary power 
when the dominant firm increases the price of the primary product at the same time 
that it offers a discount on the entire bundle. But the attribution test described 
above is the best device for identifying antitrust harm in such circumstances. To 
illustrate, suppose that the dominant firm‘s costs for products A and B are $8 and $5, 
respectively. The standalone prices are currently $10 for A and $7 for B, yielding 
separate prices totaling $17 for the two goods. Suppose that the defendant then cuts 
the price of the bundle to $16. In that case no equally efficient rival in the B product 
alone is excluded. Purchasers can take product A from the dominant firm at an 
undiscounted price of $10 and product B from the rival at a price of $6, which is 
above the rival‘s costs for B. So the attribution test is not violated, and the bundle is 
not counted as exclusionary. 
Suppose, however, that the defendant simultaneously raises the standalone 
price of A to $13 and also imposes a discount on the A+B bundle to $17, which is 
back to the original nondiscounted prices. The customer could purchase A at $13 but 
then would pay only $4 for B, which is below B‘s costs. So this discount fails the 
attribution test and is ―exclusionary‖ under the attribution test. In sum, by increasing 
the price of the dominant, or tying, good and simultaneously offering a discount from 
that increased price, the dominant firm can render a bundle exclusionary that would 
                                                                                                            
132. See 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 40, ¶ 749; Erik Hovenkamp & 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusionary Bundled Discounts and the Antitrust Modernization 
Commission, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 517 (2008). On complex bundles with variable 
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1137 (2008); Barry Nalebuff, Bundling as an Entry Barrier, 119 Q.J. ECON. 159, 160–61, 
168–70 (2004); Barry Nalebuff, Exclusionary Bundling, 50 ANTITRUST BULL. 321, 324–27 
(2005); John Thorne, Discounted Bundling by Dominant Firms, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
339, 343 (2005); Barry Nalebuff, Bundling as a Way to Leverage Monopoly 8–11 (Yale 
Sch. of Mgmt. Working Paper Series ES, No. 36, 2004). 
135. Elhauge, supra note 6, at 468–69. 
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not have been exclusionary absent the price increase.136 To say it differently, in this 
case the simultaneous price increase in standalone A renders the bundle exclusionary, 
although it would not have been so absent the price increase. 
However, the attribution test looks at the prices and costs of the products 
during the discount period, and the pricing history prior to that period is generally not 
relevant. The discount in the price increase example is exclusionary because it flunks 
the attribution test once the discount begins. The impact of the price increase in the A 
product is to make the discount flunk the attribution test, and thus it may explain why 
a dominant firm wishing to exclude a rival might exact the price increase in A. On 
other facts a price increase accompanying a discount will not exclude an equally 
efficient rival at all. For example, suppose the defendant in the above example 
increased the price of A from $10 to $11, resulting in standalone prices of $11 for A 
and $7 for B, and then offered an unbundled discount for $16. In that case a customer 
could purchase the defendant‘s product A at $11 and the rival‘s product B at $5, or its 
costs, and the discount would not be exclusionary. 
In sum, a price increase in A at the time the discount is offered may make it 
more likely that the package discount is exclusionary as measured by the attribution 
test, but the price increase itself supplies no independent reason for thinking that the 
package discount is exclusionary. As a result, there is no warrant for a presumption 
that a package discount accompanied by a price increase in the standalone product is 
exclusionary. Package discounts are often applied in technology-rich or other 
complex markets, such as medical devices or health care.137 Price changes in these 
markets are very common, and thus a harsh rule condemning bundled discounts 
anytime a price increase occurs in the primary product would create significant 
numbers of false positives. For example, in some medical markets annual price 
increases are common, generating a high likelihood that a competitively harmless 
bundle would be condemned. 
Nevertheless, if a bundled discount flunks the attribution test and is thus 
considered exclusionary, then a price increase in the primary product that 
accompanies the inauguration of bundling requires an explanation. The explanation 
could be anticompetitive, such as when the purpose of the increase is to render the 
bundle exclusionary under the attribution test. However, the explanation could be 
increasing costs or increasing demand for the primary product. Increasing costs do not 
require any further justification for a proportionate price increase of the primary 
product. Increasing demand is also a benign reason, and bundling may be explained 
by the fact of increased demand by those who used the primary good, without the 
secondary good being made subject to the bundled discount, but not by those who 
prefer the goods together. In that case, bundling would be a price discrimination 
device, and there is no warrant for condemning it on that ground alone.  
                                                                                                            
136. Note that this strategy is not costless to the extent it entails that the dominant 
firm will be charging more than its profit-maximizing price to those that purchase its A but 
not its B. If a sufficient number of purchasers want standalone A, the strategy could be 
unprofitable. 
137. E.g., Cascade Health Solutions v. Peacehealth, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(bundling of different levels of health care). 
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IX. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS SHOWING THAT ANTITRUST HARM 
FROM TYING SHOULD NOT BE PRESUMED 
In addition to the price and demand effects described and the effects 
resulting from scale economies or elimination of double marginalization, tying can 
produce several other benefits, most of which accrue directly to consumers. As a 
result, the analysis given above significantly underestimates the welfare value of 
ties. Namely: 
• to the extent a tie lowers the customer‘s initial fixed cost investment and 
converts the investment costs to variable, it serves to reduce customer 
investment risk; 
• economies of scale in either tying or tied product production can reduce 
producer, and thus consumer, costs; 
• by bringing smaller firms into the market, variable proportion ties can 
serve to reduce concentration in the downstream market, benefitting 
both the monopolist and consumers; this is particularly true of franchise 
ties and, relatedly, of intellectual property licensing; 
• many ties reflect production or provision cost savings, improvements in 
product quality, or overall product satisfaction. 
A. Changing Fixed/Variable Cost Ratio; Risk Reduction 
As noted earlier, ties tend to result in lower fixed costs to buyers, but 
higher variable costs. This can be particularly important when high, unrecoverable, 
upfront costs might serve to deter investment. Franchising is a good example. The 
market value of a popular fast food franchise might be $1,000,000. However, the 
franchisor might sell the franchise for $200,000 and tie an overcharge on various 
goods distributed through the franchise. The result is to reduce the costs of a 
business failure to the franchisee and make entry more attractive to small, typically 
undiversified entrepreneurs. Alternatively, if the franchise is young, the franchisor 
may have a more optimistic opinion of the franchisor‘s value than the franchisee. 
The tie effectively reduces the franchisee‘s upfront investment.138 
B. More Competitive Downstream Markets 
Variable proportion ties can also address the problem of downstream 
markets that are prone to oligopoly or collusion.139 As noted previously, bundling 
tends to change customer costs from fixed to variable and also to make them more 
                                                                                                            
138. The literature on these various points is large. See, e.g., OLIVER E. 
WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 21 (1985); Benjamin Klein, The 
Economics of Franchise Contract, 2 J. CORP. FIN. 9 (1995); G. Frank Mathewson & Ralph 
A. Winter, The Economics of Franchise Contracts, 28 J.L. & ECON. 503 (1985); Paul H. 
Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract, 21 J.L. & ECON. 
223 (1978). 
139. Elimination of double marginalization does so as well, but in a different way. 
See supra text accompanying notes 116–21. 
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constant.140 By contrast, unbundled pricing tends to favor large volume users 
because it is characterized by large, upfront, fixed costs and declining marginal 
costs. For example, looking at scenario A in Table 1,141 if only three of the 
purchasing firms attain the 8000 mark, they will have per unit costs of 7¢ each or 
less, while smaller firms could have total costs as high as 42¢. The three firms 
could then collude, thus injuring both the supplier and consumers. In contrast, 
bundling tends to equalize downstream costs, making markets more competitive 
even if they have diverse firm sizes. 
For example, a gasoline refiner may contemplate franchising gasoline 
stations into a particular community. The cost of building a station, coupled with a 
reasonable return on intellectual property rights, might well amount to a million 
dollars, and the franchisor might have difficulty finding potential franchisees 
willing to make that investment. As an alternative, however, it might finance a 
large portion of the fixed-cost investment itself, charging the franchisees a sum 
sufficient to guarantee their commitment. It would then make up the rest by tying 
gasoline and charging a few cents more per gallon than the wholesale price. The 
result could be many more franchisees in the community that behave more 
competitively vis-à-vis one another and sell more gasoline overall. This is why 
exclusive dealing or tying are so common in many franchise settings, including 
retail gasoline.142 
The problem of downstream market competitiveness is also one of double 
marginalization. As a general matter, double marginalization problems can be 
addressed in two ways. One is by eliminating the circumstances under which 
double marginalization occurs, as previously discussed.143 The other is by altering 
the structure of the other market in order to make it more competitive. Tying does 
this when lower tying-product prices enable a greater number of downstream 
sellers. 
C. Economies Resulting from Joint Provision 
Finally, while we do not develop the rationales here, it is worth 
remembering that perhaps the most important reasons for tying are reductions in 
cost and improvements in quality—factors that provide the rationale for most 
ties.144 
CONCLUSION 
Antitrust‘s per se rule is reserved for practices that are so likely to cause 
antitrust harm and have so  little to defend them that detailed case-by-case 
                                                                                                            
140. See supra text accompanying note 70. 
141. See supra text accompanying note 74. 
142. E.g., Standard Oil of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 318 (1949) 
(condemning exclusive dealing in case where there was no likely anticompetitive impact); 
FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463, 473 (1923) (refusing to condemn exclusive 
dealing); Omega Envtl., Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(refusing to condemn exclusive dealing). 
143. See supra text accompanying notes 123–29. 
144. See 9 AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & ELHAUGE, supra note 3, ¶¶ 1716–1717. 
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assessment is thought to be unnecessary. They can be condemned categorically 
simply upon a showing that a few basic conditions are satisfied and that they 
belong in a particular class of restraints.145 No kind of unilaterally imposed tying 
arrangement, even by a monopolist, falls into that category. 
Rather, the case for antitrust harm from tying is ambiguous at best and 
requires detailed scrutiny into market power, rationales for tying, and 
anticompetitive effects—all the subject of antitrust‘s traditional rule of reason. 
Variable proportion tying arrangements typically injure some buyers while they 
benefit others. Most ties that increase output very likely also increase welfare, 
measured as either general welfare or consumer welfare. Further, because they are 
a type of second-degree rather than third-degree discrimination, reduced welfare 
cannot be inferred from reduced output. As a result, a court is probably wasting its 
time by considering the output effects of a tie unless they are dramatic and 
obvious. 
Also important is the fact that variable proportion ties are found in both 
highly competitive and monopolized markets. That, in itself, suggests a great deal 
about consumer welfare effects. For example, Lexmark, a manufacturer of 
computer printers, has been embroiled in litigation concerning technological and 
contractual ties of its printers to cartridges.146 But Lexmark is hardly a monopolist. 
It does not dominate any segment of the printer or cartridge market, and is far 
smaller than Hewlett-Packard, Canon, and Epson. It is consistently in fourth or 
fifth place in market share both in the United States and worldwide.147 Assuming 
printer makers are not colluding, this means that a high-volume user who believes 
it is paying too much has plenty of competitive alternatives. In such a situation, 
serious welfare losses cannot be expected. So Lexmark‘s strategy must be 
profitable for some other reason than monopoly—most likely because it increases 
output. A monopolist‘s strategy need not be any different. 
We recommend that courts in antitrust cases forget about price 
discrimination or leveraging as anticompetitive concerns and focus on foreclosure, 
                                                                                                            
145. On the rationales for antitrust‘s per se rule, see 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1509 (3d ed. 2010). 
146. See Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int‘l, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 
575 (E.D. Ky. 2009) (patent exhaustion (―first sale‖) doctrine barred Lexmark‘s printer-
cartridge tie); Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int‘l, Inc., Nos. 5:02-571, 5:04-84, 
2008 WL 4542735, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 3, 2008) (denying judgment as a matter of law on tying 
misuse claim); Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int‘l, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 861 
(E.D. Ky. 2007) (denying summary judgment on antitrust tying claim). 
147. For information on worldwide computer printer market shares, see Color 
Laser Multifunction Peripherals (MFPs) Shipments Up 6%, IDC (June 3, 2009), 
http://www.outlookseries.com/N1/Infrastructure/3049_Color_Laser_Multifunction_Periphe
rals_MFP_Shipments_Up_6%25.htm (pertaining to multifunction printers in 2009) and Are 
Printer Companies Chasing the Wrong Target?, SEEKING ALPHA (June 4, 2007), 
http://seekingalpha.com/article/37170-are-printer-companies-chasing-the-wrong-target 
(pertaining to all printers in 2007). See also Bob Snyder, EMEA Printer Market Is Up, 
ONCE (Mar. 4, 2008), http://on-ce.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view 
&id=144&Itemid=33 (showing Lexmark fourth behind HP, Canon, and Epson in the 
Europe, Middle East and African shipments for 2008). 
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or antitcompetitive exclusion.148 The one empirically identifiable exception we 
have been able to find occurs when the tie benefits no one other than the seller,149 
but such cases will almost never occur unless the tie is accompanied by a higher 
price for the tying product, an event that appears to be uncommon and should 
never be presumed. Finally, we note that even the noneconomic rationale for 
condemning ties, on the ground that price discrimination itself is an unappealing 
practice, disappears once we consider that the true impact of variable proportion 
ties is to reduce rather than increase the extent of price disparities to buyers.150 
The price discrimination rationale for tying arrangements and related 
discounting practices has proven to be robust and covers a wide range of 
circumstances. The same thing is true of ties that reduce double marginalization 
problems, which applies when both tying and tied products are sold at prices above 
cost.
151
 By contrast the conditions for competitive harm are restrictive and are 
never met in the absence of economic foreclosure.152 
Finally, this analysis suggests that the current test for evaluating ties 
under the antitrust laws is wrong on two different counts. That test requires tying 
of separate products, substantial market power in the tying product, and a ―not 
insubstantial‖ volume of tied product commerce.153 First, by failing to assess 
market foreclosure in the tied–product market, the prevailing test contains no 
device by which anticompetitive exclusion can be assessed. Second, by 
misunderstanding the nature of price discrimination ties, the test incorporates 
exaggerated concerns about leverage. 
                                                                                                            
148. See generally Bohannan, supra note 4. 
149. See supra text accompanying notes 72–73. 
150. See supra text accompanying note 74 and Table 1. 
151. See supra text accompanying notes 122–28. 
152. See Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Costs of Movement, 77 
ANTITRUST L.J. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1679849. 
153. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, §§ 10.1–.2; see also 10 AREEDA, 
HOVENKAMP & ELHAUGE, supra note 3, ¶¶ 1741–1751 (discussing the separate products 
requirement); 9 AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & ELHAUGE, supra note 3, ¶¶ 1731–1740 (discussing  
the requirement of market power in the tying product); id. ¶ 1721 (discussing the 
requirement of a ―not insubstantial‖ amount of tied product commerce); id. ¶¶ 1722–1727 
(discussing the absence of a coherent foreclosure requirement). 
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APPENDIX 
The model developed here for assessing the impact of variable proportion 
tying on consumer welfare assumes a tying arrangement containing one fixed tying 
product and one tied product that can be used with the tying product in variable 
proportions. Consumers buy one unit of the fixed good, if at all, and they purchase 
the variable good only to facilitate use of the tying good. Hence consumers will 
never buy a unit of the fixed good without also buying some quantity of the 
variable good, and they will never buy units of the variable good without buying 
one unit of the fixed good. The model speaks of the monopoly situation, in which 
the manufacturer monopolist sells the tying good at the standalone monopoly price 
and the tied good is priced competitively; and also of the tying situation, in which 
the price of the fixed good is decreased from the monopoly situation and a markup 
is applied to the variable good. In the tying situation, profits are always earned on 
sales of the variable good, while they may or may not be earned on sales of the 
fixed good. 
Consumer preferences are defined over the use of the fixed good. As in 
real world instances of tying, the variable good serves as little more than an input 
that must be regularly purchased to facilitate consumption of the fixed good. To 
that end, we will let   denote the quantity of the fixed good‘s use, which is 
described in units of the variable good. This is appropriate because the fixed good 
is generally useless without the variable good, and each unit of the variable good 
allows the same amount of consumption to be derived from the fixed good. For 
that reason, the model assumes that each consumer who buys a positive quantity of 
  also purchases one unit of the fixed good, so that the prices of both goods are 
always considered when a consumer determines his optimal purchase. Finally, 
price vectors will be given in the form              
 , where pv and pf 
give the prices of the variable and fixed goods, respectively. Eventually, different 
price vectors will be distinguished using superscripts, which will allow us to 
compare the monopoly and tying situations.  
A set of consumer types is given by             where    . The 
distribution of consumers among types is described by the probability density 
function (∙) and corresponding cumulative density function F(∙). When we begin 
using the model, we will typically assume that this distribution is unknown. A 
consumer‘s type determines the intensity level of his preferences over  , which is 
effectively a measure of how many units of   the consumer demands at a given 
price vector. The terms ―intensity level‖ and ―consumer type‖ are thus used 
interchangeably. Preferences of all consumer types are described by a surplus 
function, which is defined as the difference between utility (value) and 
expenditure. To define this surplus function, we will use the utility function  :  +
× 
Σ ⟶  , which is defined as follows for all σ ∊ Σ: 
        
   
 
 
                
  
  
                   
  
 
where Δ > 0.  
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The utility function‘s nontraditional form is intended to create a more 
realistic degree of heterogeneity among consumer purchasing decisions. This 
occurs because marginal utility does not converge to zero as   does. For that 
reason, we can be sure that, under any price vector, some mass of consumer types 
(of positive measure) will choose not to buy either good. This will allow the model 
to more realistically describe the influx of new consumers that typically results 
under variable proportion tying. Moreover, marginal utility diminishes in   at the 
same constant rate Δ > 0 for all consumers, which allows for easy comparisons of 
consumer surplus realizations. This causes the graph of each consumer‘s marginal 
utility to resemble a linear demand curve, the slope of which is the same for all 
consumer types. In this way, a consumer‘s type serves to determine the height of 
his marginal utility curve or, more accurately, its y-intercept. This is why optimal 
quantities of   increase over the range of intensity levels, which is given by Σ. Of 
course, for a given consumer type σ ∊ Σ, marginal utility is equal to zero for all 
quantities      , so that the utility function is only once differentiable. But this 
was merely a precautionary measure intended to prevent marginal utility from 
becoming negative, and because the resulting marginal utility function is very 
intuitive. Consumers will always choose quantities of   over which their utility 
functions retain the standard properties, including strict concavity. Finally, it 
should be noted that functions of both utility and marginal utility are continuous. 
We are now in a position to define individual realizations of consumer 
surplus, which will be given by the function  :   
×    
 ×     , where for all σ 
∊ Σ we define: 
          
                     
                    
  
 
We assume that each consumer chooses the quantity of his purchase by 
maximizing this function, which is strictly concave over the relevant quantities of 
  (i.e., those at which marginal utility is positive), and weakly concave 
everywhere. As such, we must assume that consumer preferences are quasilinear in 
wealth, but this is not problematic. We can assume that all consumers are endowed 
with the same amount of wealth and that this amount is large enough for all 
consumer types to purchase   in any quantity at which marginal utility is positive. 
We can then further assume that consumers are always indifferent between one 
unit of utility and one dollar. In this way, the surplus function represents 
preferences over both   and wealth, while the utility function represents only the 
portion of surplus that is derived from the consumption of  . And, because all 
consumers are endowed with the same amount of wealth, we need not include it as 
a variable of the surplus function. 
We will define the demand for   that a particular consumer type has using 
the function q:    
 ×     .  Using first order conditions, it is easy to show that 
for all σ ∊ Σ this function is given by: 
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The condition that            ensures that a consumer purchases 
the tie only if the maximal level of surplus she can achieve is nonnegative. It 
should be noted that because   is described in units of the variable good, the 
function q(P, σ) can also be considered as the Walrasian demand for that good that 
consumers of type σ ∊ Σ have. We can further use this function to determine the 
unique consumer type that achieves zero surplus when behaving optimally, but 
whose optimal quantity of   is positive. This consumer type serves as the boundary 
between consumers who do not buy   (and hence achieve zero surplus), and those 
whose optimal quantities of   are positive and engender positive amounts of 
surplus. Of all consumer types that buy   in positive quantities, this is the one of 
lowest intensity (i.e., the one that desires to use the fixed good the least). This 
consumer type can be determined as a function of prices, and will be denoted as 
γ(P). As the condition stipulated by the above demand function suggests, this type 
is defined by              . We can use this to define the mass of consumer 
types who buy positive quantities of   as                           . 
It will be helpful to define an indirect surplus function, as this will allow 
us to compare the optimal surplus realizations of different consumer types, and to 
determine how different consumer types are affected by tying. We will denote this 
indirect surplus function as V:    
 ×     , which is defined for all σ ∊ Σ as: 
                      
 
  
      
                  
                    
  
 
It will also be helpful to provide a graphical interpretation of optimal 
surplus realizations in both situations. To do this, we will let PT, PM ∊    
  denote 
the price vectors maintained in the monopoly and tying situations, respectively. To 
maintain generality, we assume only that   
    
       
    
   Figure 6 
illustrates the marginal utility function of a single consumer type and can be 
treated as a demand function in order to determine the optimal quantity of his 
purchase, which varies between situations. This also allows us to see the optimal 
level of surplus that this consumer achieves in each situation. 
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Figure 6 
 
The curve labeled ( , σ) describes the marginal utility of the consumer 
type σ ∊ Σ. The prices of the variable good resulting under the two situations are 
plotted along the vertical axis. Conversely, the prices of the fixed component are 
described as different combinations of the areas A1, A2, and A3. The optimal 
quantities purchased by this consumer in the two situations are found at the 
intersections of variable price and marginal utility. In this case, these are given by 
q(PT, σ) = qT and q(PM, σ) = qM in the tying and monopoly situations, respectively. 
The utility a consumer derives from a given quantity   is given by the total area 
under the marginal utility curve, taken over the interval [0,  ]. To determine the 
consumer‘s surplus realization, the net expenditure on the variable good (given by 
the area under the variable price curve, taken up to the quantity purchased) and the 
price of the fixed good are subtracted from the consumer‘s utility. In this way, the 
consumer depicted here achieves optimal surplus levels of V(PT, σ) = A2 + S1 in 
the tying situation and V(PM, σ) = S1 + S2 in the monopoly situation. 
As mentioned earlier, a consumer‘s type indicates the point at which her 
marginal utility function intersects the vertical axis. Because this curve has the 
same slope for all consumer types, Figure 6 also indicates what consumer types 
purchase positive quantities of   in the two situations. As the figure implies, a 
consumer type can receive a positive amount of surplus only if her marginal utility 
curve intersects the vertical axis at a point above the area of the fixed good‘s price. 
Hence any consumers of type      will never buy a positive quantity of  , 
because they would achieve a negative amount of surplus in both situations. 
Conversely, any consumer with type         will purchase positive 
quantities of   only in the tying situation. All remaining consumer types buy 
positive quantities of   in both situations, though these quantities are always 
972 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 52:925 
smaller under tying. In fact, all of these consumers reduce their optimal quantities 
of   by the same amount, as their marginal utility curves all maintain the same 
constant slope. 
It will be useful to compare how different consumer types are affected by 
the transition from monopoly pricing to variable proportion tying. Figure 7 
describes how surplus realizations vary among consumer types, and how those 
realizations compare under the different pricing situations: 
Figure 7 
 
 
As this graph demonstrates, this particular tie causes a larger number of 
consumer types to buy positive quantities of  . This is equivalent to saying that 
tying creates positive surplus realizations at lower levels of σ, so that γ(PT) < 
γ(PM). For that reason, we will refer to consumer types located in the interval  
[ γ(PT), γ(PM) ) as low intensity consumer types, which the text defines as those 
who buy only under tying. Trivially, all low intensity consumers buy more units of 
  under tying, because they buy zero units otherwise. Also, there is a unique 
consumer type σ* that achieves the same positive level of surplus in both 
situations. However, Figure 6 demonstrates that all consumers in Γ(PM) reduce the 
quantities of   they purchase in the tying situation, and by the same amount. Thus, 
consumer types in Γ(PM) and to the left of σ* buy fewer units of   under tying, but 
strictly benefit from the tie. Conversely, consumer types in Γ(PM) and to the right 
of σ* also buy fewer units under tying and are strictly harmed by the tie. 
The tie depicted in Figure 7 causes new consumers to begin buying 
positive quantities of  . These new consumers obviously benefit from the tie. But 
the tie also provides more surplus to some consumers who already bought positive 
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quantities of   in the monopoly situation (i.e., some consumers in Γ(PM)). Finally, 
some consumer types achieve strictly less surplus in the tying situation, though 
these consumers still achieve positive levels of surplus in both situations. As such, 
the welfare effects of the tie are not obvious, because some consumers are better 
off, while others are harmed. Rather, the welfare effects of a tie are obvious only in 
the most flagrant instances of tying, or those in which no consumers are better off. 
Fortunately, an easy test can be implemented to determine whether or not this is 
the case. This test, which we describe as the consumer benefit test, queries whether 
a variable proportion tie benefits any consumer types. Because the indirect surplus 
function merely shifts its position between the two situations, it is clear that V(PT, 
σ) > V(PM, σ) at some σ ∊ Σ if and only if it is also true that γ(PT) < γ(PM). This 
means that the consumer benefit test is equivalent to the question of whether the tie 
brings any low intensity consumer types into the market. Accordingly, the 
consumer benefit test is necessarily passed if output of the fixed good increases. 
Importantly, if the tie passes the test, then we cannot infer that the tie decreases 
welfare. The following account provides a more explicit definition of the test: 
Consumer benefit test: Let       
    
      
 , where   
  is the 
(perfectly) competitive price of the variable good, and where   
  is the monopoly 
price of the fixed good. Let T be a variable proportion tie that imposes the price 
vector       
    
      
  in place of PM, where   
    
       
    
 . Then T 
passes the consumer benefit test if and only if Γ(PM) forms a nontrivial subset of 
Γ(PT).  
This test is useful, because it implies that two sorts of consumer types are 
strictly better off under tying. First, the consumer types that buy positive quantities 
of   only under tying are obviously better off, as this allows them to achieve a 
positive level of surplus, which would be impossible otherwise. Second, the tie 
benefits some consumer types that buy positive quantities of   in both situations, 
even though these consumers buy fewer units of   in the tying situation. This latter 
sort of consumer is particularly important because those who favor a law 
condemning variable proportion ties have often argued that all of the consumers 
who consume less under tying are made worse off by the tie. In fact, this assertion 
is false whenever the consumer benefit test is passed, as the following proposition 
illustrates:  
Proposition 1:  
             
          
    
        
    
     Assume that Γ(PM) is 
nonempty. Then there is a mass of consumer types in Γ(PM) that achieve strictly 
more surplus under tying if and only if the consumer benefit test is passed. 
Proof: (⟹) Assume the consumer benefit test is passed, so that Γ(PM) ⊊ 
Γ(PT). 
V(P , σ) is strictly increasing in σ, so σ ∊ Γ(P ) implies σ‘ ∊ Γ(P ) for all σ‘ 
> σ, for any   = T, M. This implies γ(PT) < γ(PM). 
V(PT, γ(PT)) = 0, by the definition of γ(PT), and implies V(PT, γ(PM)) > 0, 
since V(∙,∙) is strictly increasing in σ. Hence V(PT, γ(PM)) > V(PM, γ(PM)) 
= 0. 
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⟹ ∃ε > 0 such that σ ∊ (γ(PT), γ(PT) + ε) implies V(PT, σ) > V(PM, σ), 
since V(∙,∙) is continuous in each of its arguments. 
(⟸) Assume the set                              is 
nonempty, and has positive measure.  
We have that Vσ(P
T, σ) < Vσ(P
M, σ) at all σ, where Vσ(∙,∙) denotes the 
partial derivative of V(∙,∙) with respect σ. This implies that, for all σ, σ‘ ∊ 
Γ(PM) with σ‘ < σ, σ‘ ∊   whenever σ ∊  , because the difference V(PT, 
∙) − V(PM, ∙) is strictly diminishing over Γ(PM). Thus   is an interval with 
lower bound γ(PM).  
⟹ V(PT, γ(PM)) > 0, since V(PT, γ(PM)) − V(PM, γ(PM)) > 0. 
⟹ ∃ε > 0 such that σ ∊ (γ(PM) − ε, γ(PM)) implies V(PT, σ) > 0 = V(PM, 
σ), because V(∙,∙) is continuous. 
⟹ γ(PT) < γ(PM), which implies Γ(PM) ⊊ Γ(PT). 
This proof demonstrates that, whenever a tie persuades new consumer 
types to buy positive quantities of  , some consumer types who already bought   in 
positive quantities under monopoly pricing are better off. At this point it will be 
helpful to distinguish between different groups of consumer types according to the 
way in which their surplus realizations are impacted by tying. We will define 
 L(P
T, PM) = { σ ∊ Σ | γ(PT) < σ < γ(PM) } to be the set of low intensity consumer 
types who are drawn in by the tie, or those who (i) buy positive   only in the tying 
situation; and (ii) achieve positive surplus only in the tying situation. One corollary 
of proposition 1 is that, when a tie passes the consumer benefit test, there is a 
unique consumer type that achieves the same positive level of surplus in both 
situations, provided that the upper bound of Σ is sufficiently high. This follows 
because, as the proof of proposition 1 states, the difference V(PT, ∙) − V(PM, ∙) is 
decreasing in σ, and it is doing so at an increasing rate. For that reason, we will 
define σ*(PT, PM) to be the unique consumer type in Γ(PM) at which the 
aforementioned difference is equal to zero, but which achieves positive surplus in 
both situations. This consumer type is indifferent between the tying and monopoly 
situations, even though consumers of this type buy fewer units of   under tying. 
With this, we can define the set  M(P
T
, P
M
) = [ γ(P
M
), σ*( P
T
, P
M
) ) to be the set of 
medium intensity consumer types who benefit from the tie, but nevertheless buy 
fewer units under tying. These consumer types comprise the portion Γ(PM) to the 
left of the indifferent consumer type. Finally, we will define the set of consumers 
who are injured by the tie. Explicitly, we will define  H(P
T, PM) = ( σ*( PT, PM),   
] to be the set of high intensity consumer types, who buy fewer units and achieve 
less surplus under tying. 
Proposition 1 is useful because it demonstrates that the positive effects of 
tying are not limited to the surplus realizations derived from the low consumer 
types who only enter the market under tying. This casts additional doubt on any 
claim that variable proportion ties are inherently welfare reducing. Indeed, when a 
tie passes the consumer-benefit test, such a claim would be justified only if we 
have reason to believe that the welfare gains resulting from low- and medium-
intensity consumers are outweighed by the welfare reductions accrued from high 
intensity buyers. Of course, this determination would seem to require detailed 
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knowledge concerning the distribution of consumers among consumer types. In 
fact, the following proof demonstrates that, when the distribution of consumers 
among types is unknown, a tie that passes the consumer benefit test has an 
ambiguous impact on total consumer welfare. 
Proposition 2:              
          
    
        
    
    Assume that the 
consumer benefit test is passed, and the distribution of consumers among 
consumer types, denoted as  *, is unknown. Then the welfare effects of the tie are 
ambiguous, meaning we cannot determine whether the tie caused total consumer 
welfare to increase or decrease.  
Proof: Assume the consumer-benefit test is passed, and let   be the space 
of possible (continuous) distributions of consumers among types.  
Given a distribution   ∊  , let ( ) define the effect of tying on total 
consumer welfare when consumers are distributed among types according 
to  . Explicitly: 
                              
 
     
 
 
⟹        gives the expected value of the difference         
         under the distribution  , and given that          
⟹ (∙) is bounded above by V(PT, γ(PM)) − V(PM, γ(PM)) > 0, because the 
consumer type γ(PM) benefits most from tying. (This follows from the 
proof of proposition 1.) Likewise, (∙) is bounded below by V(PT,   ) − 
V(PM,  ) < 0, because the consumer type   is most injured by tying.  
For simplicity, let W+ = V(PT, γ(PM)) − V(PM, γ(PM)), and W− = V(PT,  ) 
− V(PM,   ). 
(∙) can get arbitrarily close to W+ and W− by choosing different 
distributions, which is possible even if density is positive at all consumer 
types.  
⟹ ( *) ∊ (W+, W−)    , where W+ > 0 > W−. 
⟹ The welfare effects of the tie are ambiguous, as it is impossible to tell 
whether it caused total consumer welfare to increase or decrease. 
This result is important because it implies that, if a tie passes the 
consumer-benefit test, its effect on consumer welfare generally cannot be 
determined unless one has information concerning the distribution of consumers 
among consumer types. That is, depending on whether consumers are relatively 
more or less intensive, a tie might decrease or increase total consumer welfare. 
Moreover, this result holds regardless of any production efficiencies that might 
result from the tie. As such, this result would tend to suggest that government 
intervention is unwarranted when a tie passes the consumer benefit test, 
particularly if the tie results in production efficiencies. 
As described earlier, new consumer types buy more units of the variable 
good under tying and low intensity consumer types buy fewer units of the variable 
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good under tying but, nevertheless, both classes of consumer benefit from the tie. 
This implies that one cannot determine a tie‘s impact on consumer welfare by 
merely observing what impact it has on output of the variable good. For example, 
it is possible most consumers are distributed along medium and high intensity 
ranges, and each range has the same cumulative density. Further, suppose that the 
medium-intensity consumers benefit by the same amount that high-intensity 
consumers are injured. Then, if there is even a small number of low-intensity 
consumers, consumer welfare is improved and output of the variable good will fall. 
(Of course, a tie increases total output of the fixed good if and only if it passes the 
consumer benefit test because the set of consumers who buy positive quantities of 
  is equivalent to the set of consumers who buy the fixed good.) This example 
does not suggest the tie would be less profitable than monopoly pricing, even if it 
does not result in production efficiencies. Indeed, it is easy to use figure A to show 
that when the fixed good is sold at cost under tying, low intensity consumers are 
profit increasing, medium-intensity consumers are profit decreasing, and high-
intensity consumers are split between these possibilities. The relative profitability 
of all consumer types only increases when the fixed good is sold above cost under 
tying. In this way, it is easy to construct a distribution that makes tying profitable 
and welfare increasing, even though it causes output of the variable good to fall. 
